The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku, Associate Director of the Peace and War Center, yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris Associate Professor of Philosophy, dmorris3@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. James Deitch, Senior Research Fellow, Peace and War Center

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

In Nigeria, a long-standing security crisis has recently captured the attention of many Evangelical Christians in America. The narrative of Islamic terrorists targeting Nigerian Christians simply because of their faith has resulted in fierce condemnation of Nigeria’s Federal Government from American religious freedom groups[i] and conservative elected officials [ii]who view the current government as either unable or unwilling to stop the violence. Individuals like President Trump[iii] and West Virginia Congressman Riley Moore[iv] go one step beyond this, choosing to label the ongoing violence against Christians as a genocide.

Christians in Nigeria certainly face a precarious and dangerous environment, as borne out by available statistics. While gathering evidence regarding violence against Christians remains difficult, particularly in the rural regions of the country, individual examples shed a frightening light on the situation. Kidnappings, armed assaults, or property destruction of Christians or churches have occurred in Ayetoro Kiri, Kajuru, Agwara, Barkin Ladi, Ojije, Apa, and Owo just in the first two months of 2026 alone. The International Society for Civil Liberties and Rule of Law conducted the most extensive study on the matter, finding that at least 52,000 Nigerian Christians were killed between 2009 and 2023.[v]

Under President Trump, the U.S. has shifted its intentions in Nigeria to publicly express a firmer interest in protecting Nigerian Christians. The so-called “Christmas Day Strike” against alleged Islamic State terrorists in Sokoto State, Nigeria,[vi] and the deployment of 200 military personnel to help train the Nigerian Army in combined arms coordination mark an escalation of American involvement in Nigeria.[vii] The U.S. Ambassador Mike Walz has spoken out against the violence targeting Christians in Nigeria,[viii] and on February 23, Republican leadership on the House Appropriations and Foreign Affairs Committees provided a report[ix] outlining potential steps this administration could take to help end the violence against Christians.

Unfortunately, the singular focus on “protecting Christians” as advanced by the Trump administration is standing in the way of promoting meaningful change for and security inside Nigeria. Whether it is the Fulani militias, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State-Sahal Province (ISSP), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), Boko Haram, cultists, the Lakurawa, or bandits, the reasons for violence in Nigeria, directed at Christians or not, are incredibly complex. Choosing to reduce the complicated nature of insecurity to merely being anti-Christian is wrong and also restricts the ability of the U.S. to assist with Nigeria’s security issues.

Invest in Nigeria’s Economy

Firstly, economic development and investments are necessary to build Nigeria’s economy. Radicalization to commit violent acts often begins in poor economic conditions,[x] so it should come as no surprise that in 2022, the World Bank found that over 41 percent of Nigerians lived on less than $3 per day.[xi] With limited economic opportunities, young men, especially, can be easily swayed into joining radical groups to gain status and economic stability. Violent groups have fine-tuned their recruitment strategies to include targeting these young men with messages of pride and a good-paying job, a tactic that has reaped substantial benefits for terror organizations located inside Nigeria.

To start, the United States should restore USAID funding to Nigeria, build on the recently announced Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) committing $2.1 billion to the Nigerian healthcare system,[xii] and work with the Nigerian Federal Government to develop educational, health, and economic programs and projects. The foreign aid retreat by President Trump harms the domestic security of countries like Nigeria, with the potential security benefits far exceeding any monetary cost. Investments into healthcare and education will create a healthier and better-educated Nigerian populace, which will allow for greater economic growth that severely reduces the economic argument that terror and banditry groups utilize to draw in new recruits.

The nearly complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz and dramatic increases in oil prices worldwide highlight the opportunity that joint American-Nigerian investments in Nigeria’s oil industry could yield. Even with an oil reserve of nearly 37 billion barrels under its ground,[xiii] old infrastructure, poorly maintained equipment, pipeline thieves, and kidnapping threats against oil workers have combined to drive oil production down to just 1.5 million barrels per day.[xiv] With one of President Trump’s priorities being energy dominance and protecting American energy needs, modernizing Nigeria’s oil infrastructure and protecting against kidnappings and stealing would allow Nigeria to enjoy far higher oil production, with the subsequent increase in funding further aiding its security situation.

Congress should also set standards and benchmarks for the Nigerian Federal Government to meet or exceed in order to obtain additional funding and aid. On democracy,[xv] human rights,[xvi] and corruption,[xvii] substantial reforms will be necessary to shift Nigeria from its current sickly condition to a healthy nation. Incorporating more voices into the democratic process, ensuring that Nigerians of all faiths can practice their religion safely, and cracking down on corruption can all improve the quality of life for Nigerians.

Critics of foreign aid have reasonably noted that merely handing out cash or investments is problematic and wastes taxpayer money. Evidence[xviii] shows that setting benchmarks for foreign aid can lead to more successful investments because funds are used more effectively. In Nigeria’s case, the dual benefit of benchmarks includes helping Nigerians while also promoting the safety of its residents and the effectiveness of American aid.

Protect Moderate Islamic Voices Against Jihadism

Policymakers cannot forget about violence targeting Nigerian Muslims, coupled with the responsibility of Islamic leaders to speak out. Mass attacks in Kwara, Niger, Kebbi, and Zamfara states since the start of 2026 have caused nearly 300 civilians to be killed as of early March, with the violence primarily targeting more moderate Muslims. Furthermore, moderate and liberal Muslims carry a social and spiritual obligation to call out Jihadism as a distortion of Islam. The repeal of Sharia law in 12 Northern Nigeria states[xix] is another area where cooperation between more moderate Muslims, Christians, and U.S. elected officials can occur, because the infusion of religious dogma into Nigeria’s legal system can cause discrimination and suffering for non-Muslims.

Islamic clerics play a critical role in leading their Muslim communities and have the opportunity to shape the beliefs of younger Muslims, especially young men, away from Jihadist theology and ideology. In Northern states like Sokoto State, which carries a history of Caliphate theology, clerics can combat such history and beliefs to reduce the potential recruit pool for terror groups, which prey upon younger Muslim men who already have extreme religious beliefs.

Radical terror groups such as Boko Haram, ISSP, or ISWAP frequently target outspoken Muslims who call out their violence, shining a bright spotlight on the much-needed military support and reforms needed to protect Nigerians who oppose the violence. The Woro community attack in Kwara State, which made the rounds in Western media and saw at least 170 villagers killed, appears to have been a case of refusal of the villagers to submit to a more extreme version of Islam.[xx] Cases like this make it less likely that moderate Muslims speak out; however, protecting such voices can increase the number and volume of Muslims speaking up against Jihadism.

Support Nigeria’s Military

On the military side, the small contingent of American trainers and the targeting of Northeast Nigeria will not be enough. When combating terror and banditry groups, targeting their recruitment pool by economically investing and utilizing moderate clerics to correct wrong Islamic beliefs will at least partly help; however, the Nigerian Army will eventually need to be equipped, trained, and motivated to defeat the various violent threats facing the country.

There are multiple ways for Nigeria and the U.S. to work together to improve military outcomes without deploying American combat troops directly. Firstly, increased usage of drones and U.S. Air Force ISR capabilities will help the Nigerian Air Force’s ability to track and target bandits and terrorists. Secondly, increased mobility and training in more rapid small-unit movements could help pursue terrorists and bandits, thereby leveling the playing field. Finally, increased training standards and weeding out incompetent military leadership will build a better lead and a more lethal military force.

Sales of military equipment and munitions, like a $346 million 2025 deal,[xxi] would generate profits for the American defense industry while also better equipping the Nigerian military. The sale of both attack and ISR drones would help Nigeria’s Air Force identify and destroy terror combatants, who currently enjoy the ability to hide themselves in more remote areas. Additionally, increasing the Army’s mobile capabilities would enable units to respond more quickly to crises, rather than having elongated response times, as in the Kwara massacre, where it took the Army 10 hours to respond.

Conclusion

The solution to Nigeria’s security crisis is complex and cannot be fixed overnight. That said, the Trump administration’s concern only for Christians, belief that violence is inherently anti-Christian, and limited assistance to Nigeria will not solve the issue. Investments in Nigeria’s oil industry, as well as its economic, health, and education sectors, can improve living standards and create viable opportunities for individuals who might otherwise be drawn to jihadist groups or banditry. The Nigerian Army and Air Force will require additional capabilities, training, and equipment to fully crackdown against the various violent threats facing the country. Moderate Muslim voices will need to speak out against Jihadism and call it the distortion of Islam that it is. These – and other policy changes and reforms – will require time, money, and effort; however, the consequences of refusing to act or only taking small steps when giant leaps are necessary will be more suffering, more killing, and an increasingly unstable and unsafe Nigeria.

Matthew Kolb is a graduate of Norwich University (’24) and a current Master of Divinity Student at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. He works as a global analyst and was previously an Information Warfare Intern at Norwich University Applied Research Institute and a student fellow for the Center for Global Resilience and Security.

[i] “Voice of the Martyrs – Praying for Persecuted Christians in Nigeria.” The Voice of the Martyrs. Accessed May 19, 2026. https://www.persecution.com/globalprayerguide/nigeria/.

[ii] “Smith, Moore Introduce the Nigeria Religious Freedom and Accountability Act of 2026.” Representative Riley Moore, February 10, 2026. https://rileymoore.house.gov/media/press-releases/smith-moore-introduce-nigeria-religious-freedom-and-accountability-act-2026.

[iii] New York Times. “What to Know: Trump Labels Nigeria’s Christian Violence a ‘Genocide.’” The New York Times. Accessed May 19, 2026. https://www.nytimes.com/2025/11/21/world/africa/nigeria-trump-genocide-claims.html.

[iv] “Fox News: ‘Genocide Can’t Be Ignored’: GOP Lawmaker Backs Trump’s Threat of Military Action in Nigeria.” Representative Riley Moore, January 16, 2026. https://rileymoore.house.gov/media/in-the-news/fox-news-genocide-cant-be-ignored-gop-lawmaker-backs-trumps-threat-military.

[v] “Nigeria.” Global Christian Relief, October 17, 2025. https://globalchristianrelief.org/resources/countries/nigeria/.

[vi] Palmer, Alexander, and Erin Oppel. “Why Did the United States Conduct Strikes in Nigeria?” CSIS, 2025. https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-did-united-states-conduct-strikes-nigeria.

[vii] Noury, Tanya. “Pentagon to Deploy Roughly 200 Troops to Nigeria.” Military Times, February 13, 2026. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2026/02/13/pentagon-to-deploy-roughly-200-troops-to-nigeria/.

[viii] United States Mission to the United Nations. “Remarks at a U.S. Hosted Event on ‘Combatting Religious Violence and the Killing of Christians in Nigeria.’” USUN . Accessed May 26, 2026. https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-u-s-hosted-event-on-combatting-religious-violence-and-the-killing-of-christians-in-nigeria/.

[ix] “Appropriators Deliver Joint Report on Christian Persecution in Nigeria to White House.” House Committee on Appropriations - Republicans, February 23, 2026. https://appropriations.house.gov/news/press-releases/appropriators-deliver-joint-report-christian-persecution-nigeria-white-house.

[x] United Nations. “Links between Extreme Poverty, Violent Extremism Can Be Broken by Creating Jobs, Reducing Inequalities, General Assembly Hears as Debate Concludes.” United Nations, February 16, 2016. https://press.un.org/en/2015/ga11761.doc.htm.

[xi] “Nigeria Poverty Assessment 2022.” World Bank. Accessed May 26, 2026. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2022/03/21/afw-nigeria-poverty-assessment-2022-a-better-future-for-all-nigerians.

[xii] “Expanding Faith-Based Healthcare in Nigeria Through the America First Global Health Strategy.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed May 26, 2026. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/12/expanding-faith-based-healthcare-in-nigeria-through-the-america-first-global-health-strategy.

[xiii] Editorial Board. “Nigeria’s Oil Sector Needs Fresh Thinking before the Wells Run Dry.” Businessday NG, March 21, 2026. https://businessday.ng/editorial/article/nigerias-oil-sector-needs-fresh-thinking-before-the-wells-run-dry/.

[xiv] “Nigeria’s Perennial Challenge of Meeting Its OPEC 1.5 Million Barrels per Day Quota.” Businessday NG, April 20, 2026. https://businessday.ng/insight-2/article/nigerias-perennial-challenge-of-meeting-its-opec-1-5-million-barrels-per-day-quota/.

[xv] “Nigeria: Country Profile.” Freedom House, July 31, 2025. https://freedomhouse.org/country/nigeria.

[xvi] “Nigeria: County Reports on Human Rights Practices.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed May 26, 2026. https://www.state.gov/reports/2024-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/nigeria.

[xvii] “Corruption in Nigeria .” Chatham House. Accessed May 26, 2026. https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/08/corruption-nigeria.

[xviii] Handel, Daniel. “We’re Finally Figuring out If Foreign Aid Is Any Better than Handing out Cash.” Vox, September 5, 2023. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/23854173/foreign-aid-cash-benchmarking-evidence-usaid.

[xix] “Shari’ah Criminal Law in Northern Nigeria.” USCIRF, May 26, 2026. https://www.uscirf.gov/publications/shariah-criminal-law-northern-nigeria.

[xx] Idris, Ahmed. “In Nigeria’s Woro, Massacre Leaves a Community Devastated and in Ruins.” Al Jazeera, February 9, 2026. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2026/2/9/in-nigerias-woro-massacre-leaves-a-community-devastated-and-in-ruins.

[xxi] “Nigeria – Munitions, Precision Bombs, and Precision Rockets.” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, August 13, 2025. https://www.dsca.mil/Press-Media/Major-Arms-Sales/Article-Display/Article/4273754/nigeria-munitions-precision-bombs-and-precision-rockets.

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku, Associate Director of the Peace and War Center, yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris Associate Professor of Philosophy, dmorris3@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. James Deitch, Senior Research Fellow, Peace and War Center

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

Latvia stands today in a narrowing corridor of strategic warning, where history’s long shadow has begun to sharpen into something more immediate and more volatile. The Baltic region has always lived with the memory of occupation and the proximity of Russian power, but the last year has transformed that memory into a pattern of concrete provocations. Drone incursions, airspace violations, and a steady drumbeat of accusatory rhetoric from Moscow have created an environment that increasingly resembles the early stages of a manufactured crisis. The question is no longer whether Russia is pressuring NATO’s northeastern flank. That is already established. The question is whether Moscow is preparing the informational and operational groundwork for a false‑flag event designed to fracture allied cohesion and justify further escalation.

The events of early May marked a turning point. Multiple drones originating from Russia entered Latvian airspace, with one crashing into an oil storage facility and another believed to have fallen in Rēzekne municipality. Latvian authorities chose not to intercept the drones, citing the risk of debris falling on civilians or critical infrastructure.[1] These incidents did not occur in isolation. They followed a series of Russian airspace violations across the Baltics and Poland, including NATO jets shooting down Russian drones and Estonia reporting a twelve‑minute incursion by three Russian MiG‑31s.[2] Latvia’s foreign minister has warned that Russia is deliberately testing NATO defenses with these incursions.[3] The tempo, geography, and ambiguity of these probes align closely with Russia’s long‑standing doctrine of pressure below the threshold of open conflict, a doctrine that has historically preceded false‑flag operations in Georgia, Crimea, and the Donbas.

False‑flag operations require narrative preparation, operational ambiguity, and plausible deniability. Russia has been cultivating all three. In its narrative preparation, Russian state media and official channels have increasingly framed the Baltics, and Latvia in particular, as hostile, Russophobic, and complicit in Ukrainian attacks. Moscow has accused Latvia of facilitating Ukrainian drone operations, claims Riga has dismissed as pure fiction.[4] These accusations mirror the rhetorical groundwork Russia laid before its interventions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, where allegations of persecution or covert aggression were used to justify “protective” action.

Operational ambiguity has become a central feature of Russia’s behavior. Drone incursions are ideal tools for this purpose. They can be disavowed, misattributed, or framed as Ukrainian provocations. The May drones that entered Latvia fit this pattern precisely. Their origin remains under investigation, and Russia has already denied responsibility.[5] This ambiguity creates space for Moscow to claim victimhood or to threaten retaliation if a future incident is engineered to cause casualties or damage. The ambiguity is not a flaw in the operation; it is the point.

Plausible deniability completes the triad. Russia’s Ministry of Defense has repeatedly described its flights near Baltic airspace as routine and compliant with international rules, even when aircraft lacked transponders, flight plans, or radio communication.[6] This is classic Russian signaling: normalize the abnormal, deny the obvious, and maintain a veneer of legality while probing for weakness. Taken together, these elements form the scaffolding of a false‑flag environment, one that can be activated quickly if Moscow perceives a strategic advantage.

The Strategic Environment of Escalation

The Baltic region has entered a period of heightened instability, shaped by Russia’s shifting strategic calculus and the pressures of its ongoing war in Ukraine. As Russia absorbs battlefield losses and confronts the long‑term economic and political costs of its invasion, it has increasingly turned to hybrid tactics to regain the initiative. The Baltics offer a tempting arena for such activity. They are NATO territory, but small, geographically exposed, and symbolically important. A crisis here tests the alliance’s cohesion without requiring Russia to commit large conventional forces.

Latvia’s geography amplifies this vulnerability. It shares a long border with Russia and sits adjacent to the Suwałki Gap, the narrow corridor linking the Baltic states to the rest of NATO. Russian military planners have long viewed this region as a potential pressure point. In recent months, Russian forces have increased their activity near the border, conducting exercises that simulate rapid incursions and electronic warfare operations. Reporting from the Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) has noted a rise in Russian jamming activity near the border, affecting GPS signals in southeastern Estonia and northern Latvia.[7] These activities, while not unprecedented, have taken on new significance in the context of drone incursions and escalating rhetoric.

Russia’s information operations have intensified in parallel. State media outlets have amplified narratives portraying Latvia as a failed state, a persecutor of Russian speakers, and a staging ground for Ukrainian attacks. Analysts at the Atlantic Council have noted that Russia’s messaging toward the Baltics has grown more aggressive since late 2024, with a particular focus on portraying NATO’s presence as provocative and illegitimate.[8] These narratives are not new, but their frequency and intensity have increased markedly. They serve to condition domestic audiences for potential escalation and to create a pretext for action. In this sense, the information environment is not merely background noise; it is an operational domain in its own right.

Latvia has responded with clarity and resolve. Its leaders have warned openly of the risks posed by Russian provocations and have called on NATO to strengthen its presence in the region. President Edgars Rinkēvičs has emphasized that the Baltic states are the frontline of European security and that any attack on Latvia would trigger a collective response.[9] This messaging is aimed not only at deterring Russia but also at reinforcing allied unity. Latvia understands that deterrence is as much about perception as capability.

The Baltic Times has reported that Latvia has increased its diplomatic outreach to Nordic partners, particularly Finland and Sweden, whose NATO accession has transformed the strategic map of northern Europe.[10] The emerging Baltic‑Nordic security architecture is one of the most cohesive in Europe, and Latvia is at its center. This regional alignment strengthens deterrence but also increases the stakes of any Russian provocation.

Latvia’s Military Transformation and National Readiness

Latvia’s defense reforms since 2022 have been sweeping and consequential. The reintroduction of mandatory national service marked a significant shift in national defense policy, reflecting a recognition that the security environment had fundamentally changed. Reporting from LSM, Latvia’s public broadcaster, has highlighted the rapid expansion of Latvia’s National Guard and the integration of new conscripts into territorial defense units.[11] The Latvian Armed Forces have expanded their territorial defense units, integrating volunteers and reservists into a cohesive national defense structure. This approach mirrors the Finnish model, emphasizing resilience, dispersion, and rapid mobilization in a crisis.

Latvia has also invested heavily in modernizing its equipment and infrastructure. It has acquired new air‑defense systems, anti‑armor weapons, and surveillance capabilities. These investments are designed to counter the specific threats posed by Russia’s hybrid tactics, including drones, electronic warfare, and sabotage. The development of counter‑drone capabilities has been a particular priority, reflecting the lessons learned from Ukraine and the recent incursions into Latvian airspace. Analysts at ICDS Tallinn have noted that Latvia’s counter‑drone procurement is among the most advanced in the region, with a focus on layered detection and jamming systems.[12]

The concept of a “drone wall” along NATO’s eastern border has gained traction in Latvia and its neighbors. This initiative envisions a layered system of sensors, jammers, and air defense assets designed to detect and neutralize drones before they can penetrate deeply into allied territory.[13] While still in its early stages, the drone wall represents a forward‑leaning approach to countering hybrid threats. It acknowledges that the next crisis in the Baltics may begin not with tanks or aircraft, but with drones, sabotage, or manufactured incidents.

Latvia’s integration into NATO’s forward defense posture is equally significant. The Canadian‑led NATO Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroup stationed in Latvia is set to expand into a brigade‑level formation, reflecting the alliance’s commitment to deterrence. This multinational force includes troops from Spain, Italy, the Czech Republic, and other allies, providing a visible and credible deterrent to Russian aggression. Latvia has also advocated transforming NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission into a Baltic Air Defense mission, with expanded rules of engagement and ground‑based air defense assets.[14] This shift reflects the reality that policing is no longer sufficient when drones and aircraft are probing allied airspace with increasing frequency.

Latvia’s societal resilience is another critical component of its defense posture. The government has invested in civil defense programs, public communication campaigns, and resilience planning. These efforts aim to prepare the population for potential crises, including cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and disruptions to critical infrastructure. Reporting from Yle, Finland’s national public broadcasting company, has highlighted growing cooperation between Finnish and Latvian civil defense agencies, particularly in crisis communication and infrastructure protection.[15] Latvia’s experience with Russian hybrid tactics has made it acutely aware of the need for a whole‑of‑society approach to defense.

Russia’s Escalating Pattern of Provocations

Russia’s behavior in the Baltic region over the past year has followed a clear and escalating pattern. The drone incursions of May were not isolated incidents but part of a broader campaign of hybrid pressure. Russian aircraft have repeatedly violated Baltic airspace, often flying without transponders or flight plans.[16] These violations are designed to test NATO’s response times and to create uncertainty about Russia’s intentions.

Russia has also engaged in cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns targeting Latvia and its neighbors. Analysts at the Center for European Policy Analysis have documented a surge in Russian cyber probing against Baltic energy infrastructure, particularly in Latvia and Lithuania, during the winter of 2024–2025.[17] These operations aim to undermine public trust in government institutions, sow discord within society, and weaken the alliance’s cohesion. The information domain has become a central battleground in Russia’s confrontation with the West, and Latvia has been a frequent target.

The accusations leveled by Russia against Latvia regarding Ukrainian drone activity are particularly concerning.[18] These claims, while baseless, serve to create a narrative that Latvia is engaged in hostile actions against Russia. This narrative could be used to justify retaliatory measures, including a false‑flag operation. Russia has a long history of using manufactured incidents to justify military action, from the 1999 apartment bombings to the annexation of Crimea in 2014. The current pattern of behavior in the Baltics bears troubling similarities to these past episodes.

The risk of a false‑flag event in Latvia is heightened by the ambiguity inherent in drone operations. Drones can be launched from a variety of platforms and can be easily misattributed. A drone that crashes into a civilian area could be framed as an attack by Ukraine or Latvia, providing a pretext for Russian retaliation. The ambiguity surrounding the origin of the drones that entered Latvian airspace in May underscores this risk.[19] Russia’s denial of responsibility, despite the evidence, is consistent with its past behavior and suggests that it may be preparing the ground for a more significant incident.

Baltic media outlet Delfi has reported that Russian border guards have increased their presence along the Latvian border, conducting what appear to be “inspection patrols” near crossing points.[20] While these activities are nominally routine, their timing and frequency raise concerns about potential staging or reconnaissance for a manufactured incident. Analysts at the Royal United Services Institute have warned that Russia may seek to create a crisis that blurs the line between hybrid and conventional aggression, exploiting ambiguity to delay or complicate NATO’s response.[21]

The Road Ahead: A Region on the Brink

Latvia stands at a dangerous moment defined by ambiguity, provocation, and the unmistakable signs of Russian pretext‑building. The drone incursions of May were not an anomaly. They were a warning. Russia is probing, testing, and shaping the environment for a crisis that could erupt with little notice. The combination of drone incursions, airspace violations, accusatory rhetoric, and denials is not random. It is preparatory.

Yet Latvia is not without agency. It has demonstrated clarity, resolve, and a deep understanding of the threats it faces. Its investments in defense, resilience, and diplomacy have positioned it as one of NATO’s most forward‑leaning members. Latvia’s leaders have spoken openly about the risks posed by Russia and have called on the alliance to strengthen its presence in the region. Their message is clear: the Baltics are the frontline of European security, and the frontline is being tested.

The challenge now is for NATO to match Latvia’s clarity. The alliance must recognize that the next crisis may begin not with a tank crossing a border, but with a drone falling from the sky. It must be prepared to respond swiftly and decisively to any provocation, including a false‑flag event. The credibility of the alliance depends on its ability to deter aggression and to defend its members.

The Baltics have seen this pattern before. They know what comes next if warnings go unheeded. The question is whether the rest of the alliance is listening. Latvia has done everything within its power to prepare for the worst. It has strengthened its military, fortified its society, and deepened its integration with NATO. But it cannot face the threat alone. The hour is late, but not too late. The time for vigilance is now.

Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. He attended high school in Heinavesi, Finland. He spent most of his Marine Corps career as an operations chief, serving deployments in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. He serves as a Senior Fellow at the Patton Center for Peace and War at Norwich University. His published doctoral dissertation focuses on the role of ethnic Germans in early American history. His published works can be found in Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, Voices on Peace and War, and the Journal of the American Revolution.

[1] Anna J. Davis, “Russia Rehearsing Tactics Along NATO’s Baltic Frontline,” Real Clear Defense, May 2025.

[2] “Latvia Urges NATO to Bolster Baltic Air Defence After Russian Incursions,” Reuters via US News, September 27, 2025.

[3] “Latvia Warns Russia ‘Testing’ NATO Defenses with Drone and Aircraft Incursions,” Kyiv Post, September 30, 2025.

[4] Reuters reporting on Russian accusations against Latvia regarding Ukrainian drone activity, 2025.

[5] Davis, “Russia Rehearsing Tactics Along NATO’s Baltic Frontline,” Real Clear Defense, May 2025.

[6] Ibid.

[7] ERR News, “GPS Interference Reported in Southeast Estonia,” January 2025.

[8] Atlantic Council, “Russia’s Information Strategy in the Baltics,” December 2024.

[9] “Latvia Urges NATO to Bolster Baltic Air Defence After Russian Incursions,” Reuters via US News, September 27, 2025.

[10] Baltic Times, “Latvia Deepens Security Cooperation with Nordic Partners,” February 2025.

[11] LSM, “Latvia Expands National Guard and Conscription Program,” March 2025.

[12] ICDS Tallinn, “Counter‑Drone Capabilities in the Baltic States,” April 2025.

[13] “Latvia Warns Russia ‘Testing’ NATO Defenses with Drone and Aircraft Incursions,” Kyiv Post, September 30, 2025.

[14] “Latvia Urges NATO to Bolster Baltic Air Defence After Russian Incursions,” Reuters via US News, September 27, 2025.

[15] Yle News, “Finland and Latvia Strengthen Civil Defense Cooperation,” November 2024.

[16] Davis, “Russia Rehearsing Tactics Along NATO’s Baltic Frontline,” Real Clear Defense, May 2025.

[17] CEPA, “Russian Cyber Probing of Baltic Energy Infrastructure,” January 2025.

[18] Reuters reporting on Russian accusations against Latvia regarding Ukrainian drone activity, 2025.

[19] Davis.

[20] Delfi Latvia, “Russian Border Patrol Activity Increases Near Latvian Frontier,” February 2025.

[21] RUSI, “Hybrid Escalation Risks in the Baltic Region,” December 2024.

Systems Thinking, Multidomain Literacy, Epistemic Humility, and Values-Based Judgment in the Preparation of Future Military Officers

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku, Associate Director of the Peace and War Center, yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris Associate Professor of Philosophy, dmorris3@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. James Deitch, Senior Research Fellow, Peace and War Center

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

Hybrid warfare has collapsed the comfortable distance between certainty and chaos that industrial-era command doctrine once assumed it could administer. The conflicts of the early twenty-first century—in Ukraine, Syria, and the South China Sea, and across the gray zone of sub-threshold competition—blend conventional force with irregular tactics, cyber operations, information campaigns, economic coercion, and the instrumentalization of proxy actors.¹ What distinguishes this mode of conflict is not the novelty of its components, most of which are historically familiar, but their fusion, their simultaneity, and the deliberate cultivation of ambiguity designed to paralyze adversarial decision-making.² The challenge this poses to professional military education (PME) is therefore not principally tactical or technological. It is cognitive. Western military education has long privileged analytical rationalism—the belief that sufficient intelligence and planning can reduce operational uncertainty to manageable risk—over the epistemic humility that genuinely complex environments demand.³ Preparing officers for hybrid warfare requires reorienting that education around four interlocking capacities: systems thinking for complexity, multidomain literacy, epistemic humility, and values-based judgment. These are not competencies to be appended to existing programs; together they constitute a different conception of what military leadership is.

Systems Thinking and the Discipline of Complexity

The most useful entry point for teaching officers to act in complexity is the distinction between the complicated and the complex. Snowden and Boone’s Cynefin framework separates decision contexts by the relationship between cause and effect.⁴ In the complicated domain—the domain that traditional military planning implicitly assumes—cause-and-effect relationships exist but require expertise to discern, so analysis and best practice are appropriate. In the complex domain, cause and effect can be perceived only in retrospect, and what is required instead is emergent practice: experimentation, safe-to-fail probes, and continuous sense-making. The hybrid battlespace, with its multiplicity of actors, opaque intentions, and nonlinear dynamics, is paradigmatically complex. The trained reflex of treating a complex problem as merely complicated produces fragile plans built on incorrect assumptions, a failure pattern documented in critical examinations of how armies have actually operationalized design methods.⁵ The corrective is a shift from problem-solving, which presumes the situation is already understood, to problem-framing, which cultivates the capacity to perceive and articulate the nature of the situation itself.⁶ This implies a preconception of command: from hierarchical control toward enabling distributed intelligence across a network, where agility—the ability to succeed across a wide range of conditions—becomes the primary military virtue.⁷ The danger, well documented in practice, is that design and systems methods degrade into elaborate but unfalsifiable diagrams that simulate rigor without delivering it. Genuinely systemic thinking cannot be transmitted as content; it requires a qualitative transformation in how an officer reasons—a developmental achievement that standardized instruction alone cannot produce.

Multidomain Literacy

If complexity describes the structure of the environment, multidomain literacy describes the breadth of fluency it demands. Rupert Smith’s observation that the very utility of force has been transformed remains the clearest statement of the problem: contemporary leaders rarely apply force in bounded ways against uniformed adversaries but must operate in the “war amongst the people,” where every act of violence carries political, legal, and informational consequences at once.⁸ The information environment is no longer a supporting function but a central operational variable – the main effort; narrative, perception, and attribution are themselves terrain.⁹ The defining strategic failures of recent Western interventions have repeatedly traced to an inability to read the social, tribal, and political ecosystems within which conflict unfolds.¹⁰ The competence this requires can be cultivated. Cultural intelligence—the capability to function effectively across culturally diverse settings—predicts cross-border leadership effectiveness beyond general and emotional intelligence, which means it must be developed systematically through education rather than acquired piecemeal through operational exposure.¹¹ The officer of the hybrid era must read military, political, economic, informational, and cultural terrain simultaneously—a demand that single-discipline mastery cannot satisfy and that anticipates the need for genuinely interdisciplinary education.

Epistemic Humility

Military culture has historically rewarded the projection of certainty and the suppression of doubt. This disposition is reinforced by the confidence heuristic—the tendency of listeners to treat a speaker’s expressed certainty as a proxy for accuracy and to defer to the most confident voice—an effect that intensifies in hierarchical organizations under stress.¹² Adaptive in bounded combat, the same heuristic in complex political-military settings systematically produces overconfidence, premature closure, and “singular solution” thinking: the failure to generate and maintain competing hypotheses.¹³ The empirical case for the opposite disposition is strong. Tetlock’s study of expert judgment found that “foxes,” who draw on multiple analytical frameworks and tolerate uncertainty, decisively outperform “hedgehogs,” who apply a single grand theory to every situation.¹⁴ Calibrated uncertainty—the disciplined quantification of confidence across possible futures—is, moreover, a teachable skill that measurably improves forecasting.¹⁵ Cultivating it is inseparable from cultivating reflective practice: the capacity to reframe a situation in real time and to maintain metacognitive distance while remaining engaged.¹⁶ The cost of neglecting this is well documented; the most consequential intelligence failures share a common structure of premature convergence on a single explanatory frame that filters out disconfirming evidence.¹⁷ No analytic technique can substitute for a command culture that genuinely values the surfacing of uncertainty—and that culture must begin in PME.

Values-Based Decision-Making Under Uncertainty

The dominant doctrinal model of decision-making, exemplified by the Military Decision-Making Process, is a classical rational sequence that assumes time, information, and cognitive capacity for systematic deliberation—conditions that rarely obtain in the time-compressed, information-saturated hybrid environment. Naturalistic studies of expert commanders describe a different reality: recognition-primed decision-making, in which experienced practitioners use pattern recognition to identify plausible courses of action, mentally simulate them, and iterate rapidly.¹⁸ Yet pattern recognition fails precisely when a situation is genuinely novel and the experiential library contains no adequate analog. In such moments, leaders must fall back on deeply internalized values and principles that supply decision criteria in the absence of situational clarity. The cultivation of practical wisdom—phronesis, the capacity for moral reasoning under uncertainty—must therefore be treated as a core educational objective rather than a supplementary virtue.¹⁹ Dual-process psychology explains why this internalization matters: extreme stress degrades slow, deliberative reasoning while preserving fast, intuitive responses, so ethical commitments must be habituated to the point that they operate intuitively rather than through classroom recall.²⁰ This is especially acute in hybrid conflict, where adversaries deliberately blur the lines between combatant and civilian and between lawful and unlawful action, leaving officers to act on incomplete information, weigh competing obligations, and hold ethical standards even as opponents violate them.²¹ The institutional architecture for this distributed judgment is mission command—the delegation of authority to the lowest competent level under a commander’s intent—whose full realization depends less on doctrine than on a culture that rewards initiative and tolerates the failure that accompanies it.²²

Conclusion: The Reflective Practitioner-Strategist

These four capacities are not discrete additions to a curriculum but facets of a single underlying ability: to lead in the complex domain. The industrial-era image of the decisive, all-knowing commander who plans comprehensively and executes relentlessly is not merely outdated in hybrid environments; it is actively dangerous. The commander who cannot tolerate uncertainty will manufacture false certainty; the one who cannot reframe will impose an inadequate frame; the one who cannot learn will repeat the very errors an adaptive adversary anticipates; and the one whose ethics are not deeply internalized will compromise them under stress. The alternative is the reflective practitioner-strategist—intellectually broad, psychologically hardy, epistemically humble, culturally intelligent, and institutionally courageous. Producing such leaders points toward a recognizable pedagogy: case-based and experiential learning that engages ambiguous problems without tidy resolution; interdisciplinary breadth; red-teaming and adversarial perspective-taking; sustained reflective practice; and values-centered ethical reasoning integrated throughout rather than confined to a module.²³ Curriculum reform alone, however, will not suffice. Selection and assessment systems must change with it, because the qualities that make leaders effective in complexity—intellectual humility, openness, and collaborative judgment—are routinely undervalued relative to the confidence and assertiveness that drive leaders to emerge in the first place, so the very dispositions hybrid warfare rewards may be the ones existing pipelines screen out.²⁴ To deliver such leaders, military education must itself undergo the adaptive transformation it seeks to cultivate in its students, trading the comfort of standardized curricula and risk-averse culture for productive ambiguity, rigorous debate, and experiential diversity. The decisive margin in the wars of this century will not be found in platforms or numbers alone. It will be found in the quality of thinking, judging, and leading under conditions of profound uncertainty—capacities that only deliberate, sustained, and intellectually serious professional education can develop.

Colonel (Ret.) William F. Lyons Jr. is a 1990 graduate of Norwich University. He served in the US Army and Army Reserves for 31 years, principally as a human intelligence officer. He served at every level of command from detachment through brigade, culminating in back-to-back brigade commands. His operational deployments include Kuwait, Bosnia, Iraq, and Germany. He holds a Juris Doctor from Suffolk University Law School and a Master of Strategic Studies from the US Army War College. He is presently the Vice President for Distance Education at Norwich University, where he is responsible for Norwich’s College of Graduate and Continuing Education. He is widely published in scholarly journals and trade publications.

Endnotes

1. F. G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007).

2. B. Renz, “Russia and ‘Hybrid Warfare,’” Contemporary Politics 22, no. 3 (2016): 283–300; M. Galeotti, Russian Political War: Moving Beyond the Hybrid (Routledge, 2019).

3. C. Paparone, “Critical Military Epistemology: Designing Reflexivity into Military Curricula,” Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 17, no. 4 (2017): 123–138.

4. D. J. Snowden and M. E. Boone, “A Leader’s Framework for Decision Making,” Harvard Business Review 85, no. 11 (2007): 68–76.

5. M. A. Thomas, “Spaghetti: Systems Thinking and the US Army,” Defence Studies 19, no. 2 (2019): 149–169.

6. Paparone, “Critical Military Epistemology.”

7. A. Bousquet, The Scientific Way of Warfare: Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity (Hurst & Company, 2009); D. S. Alberts and R. E. Hayes, Understanding Command and Control (CCRP Publication Series, 2006).

8. R. Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (Penguin, 2005). On systemic thinking as a transformation of consciousness rather than content delivery, see R. Kegan and L. L. Lahey, An Everyone Culture (Harvard Business Review Press, 2016).

9. J. J. McCuen, “Hybrid Wars,” Military Review 88, no. 2 (2008): 107–113.

10. D. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford University Press, 2009).

11. T. Rockstuhl, S. Seiler, S. Ang, L. Van Dyne, and H. Annen, “Beyond General Intelligence (IQ) and Emotional Intelligence (EQ): The Role of Cultural Intelligence (CQ) on Cross-Border Leadership Effectiveness in a Globalized World,” Journal of Social Issues 67, no. 4 (2011): 825–840; cf. A. Toffler and H. Toffler, War and Anti-War (Little, Brown, 1993).

12. B. D. Pulford, A. M. Colman, E. K. Buabang, and E. M. Krockow, “The Persuasive Power of Knowledge: Testing the Confidence Heuristic,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 147, no. 10 (2018): 1431–1444; K. E. Weick, “The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster,” Administrative Science Quarterly 38, no. 4 (1993): 628–652.

13. G. Klein, Streetlights and Shadows: Searching for the Keys to Adaptive Decision Making (MIT Press, 2009).

14. P. E. Tetlock, Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know? (Princeton University Press, 2005).

15. P. E. Tetlock and D. Gardner, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (Crown, 2015).

16. R. Heifetz, M. Linsky, and A. Grashow, The Practice of Adaptive Leadership (Harvard Business Press, 2009); D. A. Schön, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (Basic Books, 1983).

17. R. Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War (Cornell University Press, 2010); see also R. H. Pherson and R. J. Heuer, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis, 3rd ed. (CQ Press, 2020).

18. G. Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (MIT Press, 1999).

19. M. L. Cook, The Moral Warrior: Ethics and Service in the U.S. Military (State University of New York Press, 2004).

20. D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011).

21. G. R. Lucas, Military Ethics: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2016).

22. D. E. Vandergriff, Adopting Mission Command: Developing Leaders for a Superior Command Culture (Naval Institute Press, 2019); E. Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British, and Israeli Armies (Stanford University Press, 2011).

23. On these five orientations see D. A. Kolb, Experiential Learning (Prentice Hall, 1984); W. Murray, Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change (Cambridge University Press, 2011); L. Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford University Press, 2013); Schön, The Reflective Practitioner; and Lucas, Military Ethics.

24. T. Chamorro-Premuzic and A. Furnham, The Psychology of Personnel Selection (Cambridge University Press, 2010); on the need for senior leaders who protect innovators, see S. P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Cornell University Press, 1991).

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku, Associate Director of the Peace and War Center, yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris Associate Professor of Philosophy, dmorris3@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. James Deitch, Senior Research Fellow, Peace and War Center

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

Russia’s war against Ukraine has entered its fourth year, and the strategic question that once lingered at the margins of Western debate now presses with uncomfortable immediacy: whether Moscow intends to expand the conflict beyond Ukraine, and whether it possesses the capacity to do so. The answer is not comforting. Russia’s ambitions remain expansive, its military power degraded but far from exhausted, and the West’s political cohesion is fraying at precisely the moment when deterrence requires clarity, speed, and unity. The war has become a test not only of Ukraine’s endurance but of Europe’s ability to recognize that the security order it assumed to be permanent is now provisional. The Kremlin’s strategic logic has not changed. It seeks to revise the post–Cold War settlement, weaken NATO, and reassert dominance over territories it considers historically subordinate. What has changed is the geopolitical environment surrounding that ambition. The United States is consumed by the demands of a widening Middle Eastern conflict. Europe is struggling to reconcile its rhetoric of unity with its chronic underinvestment in defense. NATO is militarily strong but politically brittle. And Russia, though battered, has adapted to a long war in ways that make it more dangerous, not less.

Russian intent is the least ambiguous part of this equation. Moscow has never concealed its belief that the independence of the Baltic states was a historical accident, nor has it abandoned the narrative that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are “anti‑Russian” entities oppressing Russian speakers. These narratives are not rhetorical flourishes; they are the same justifications Russia used in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022.[1] In recent months, Russian officials have sharpened their language, warning that Baltic states aiding Ukraine could face “consequences,” including attacks on their territory.[2] Russian state media has amplified claims that Baltic airspace is being used for Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure, a charge unsupported by evidence but useful for manufacturing a pretext.[3] The pattern is familiar: create a narrative of provocation, then use it to justify retaliation. Russia’s intent toward Moldova is even clearer. Moscow has long viewed Moldova as a soft target, a state too small and politically fragile to resist sustained pressure. Russian intelligence services have repeatedly attempted to destabilize Moldovan politics through disinformation, energy coercion, and covert financing of pro‑Russian parties.[4] The objective is not necessarily to occupy Moldova but to prevent it from integrating with Europe and to use it as a pressure point against Ukraine and Romania. Even Finland, newly integrated into NATO, has become a target of Russian hybrid pressure. Moscow has threatened “military‑technical measures” in response to Finland’s accession, increased troop deployments near the border, and intensified GPS jamming and cyber operations in the Nordic region.[5] These actions are not random provocations; they are part of a broader strategy to signal that NATO’s northern flank is vulnerable.

A Degraded but Dangerous Russian Military

The question, then, is not whether Russia desires to expand the war, but whether it can. Russia has suffered staggering losses in Ukraine. Western intelligence estimates that more than 300,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded, and thousands of armored vehicles destroyed.[6] Its elite airborne units have been mauled, its Black Sea Fleet repeatedly humiliated, and its defense industry forced into a frantic wartime footing. Yet Russia’s capacity is not defined solely by its losses. It is defined by its ability to regenerate force and by the relative weakness of its neighbors. Russia has compensated for battlefield losses through mobilization, recruitment of contract soldiers, and coercive conscription in occupied territories.[7] Its population is large enough to sustain high casualty rates, and its political system is repressive enough to suppress dissent. It cannot easily generate high‑quality forces, but it can generate large quantities of infantry, and quantity matters in attritional warfare. Its defense industry, though strained, has adapted to sanctions more effectively than many expected. With support from Iran, North Korea, and China, Russia has increased production of artillery shells, drones, and missiles.[8] It cannot match NATO’s industrial potential, but it does not need to. It only needs to outproduce Ukraine and exploit Western delays.

Russia’s capacity for hybrid warfare remains formidable. Cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, energy coercion, and orchestrated migration flows require far fewer resources than conventional offensives. These tools are particularly effective against small states like Estonia or Latvia, where even minor disruptions can have outsized political effects. Russia’s nuclear arsenal remains intact and central to its strategy. Moscow uses nuclear threats to deter NATO intervention in Ukraine and to create political hesitation in Western capitals.[9] This leverage does not give Russia the ability to conquer NATO territory, but it does give it the ability to shape Western decision‑making. Russia does not currently have the conventional strength to launch a large‑scale invasion of the Baltic states or Finland. But it does not need to. A limited incursion, a manufactured border incident, or a hybrid attack could test NATO’s resolve without requiring massive force. Capacity matters, but perceived Western weakness matters more.

Western Hesitation and the Erosion of Deterrence

The most dangerous scenario is not one in which Russia has overwhelming military strength. It is one in which Russia believes NATO will not respond decisively. Europe’s political fragmentation, slow decision‑making, and chronic underinvestment in defense have created a perception that the continent is unprepared for rapid escalation. The European Union’s defense industrial base remains sluggish, its ammunition production insufficient, and its political unity fragile.[10] NATO’s deterrence posture relies on the assumption that the United States will intervene immediately and decisively in any conflict. But that assumption is now under strain. The United States is deeply engaged in a widening Middle Eastern conflict, supporting Israel in a war with Iran that has consumed political bandwidth, military resources, and diplomatic capital.[11] European leaders privately worry that Washington’s attention is divided and its commitments stretched. Russia does not need to defeat NATO militarily. It only needs to convince itself that NATO will hesitate. If Moscow believes that Europe cannot react quickly, or that the United States is too distracted to lead, then even a degraded Russian military becomes dangerous.

Russia has been drained militarily, politically, and diplomatically, but not in ways that reduce its appetite for risk. Its military losses are severe, but its forces have adapted. Russia has shifted to a war economy, increased production of drones and missiles, and restructured its forces for long‑term attrition.[12] The Russian military is weaker than it was in 2022, but more experienced, more mobilized, and more prepared for a prolonged conflict. Politically, Russia has become more authoritarian, not less. The war has eliminated political opposition, strengthened the security services, and consolidated Vladimir Putin’s control.[13] Political drain has not produced instability; it has produced rigidity. Diplomatically, Russia is isolated from the West but increasingly aligned with China, Iran, and North Korea.[14] It has found alternative markets for energy exports and alternative suppliers for weapons. Diplomatic drain has not weakened Russia’s strategic position as much as many expected. Russia is drained but not deterred.

The States That Stand Firm — and the One That Cannot

The West’s resolve is the decisive variable. Ukraine’s survival depends on Western support, and Europe’s security depends on Ukraine’s survival. The United States remains the backbone of NATO, but its political system is polarized, its global commitments overstretched, and its strategic focus divided. The war with Iran has strained U.S. resources and created friction with European allies who oppose aspects of the campaign.[15] Congress has struggled to pass sustained aid packages for Ukraine, and public support has softened. NATO is militarily strong but politically brittle. Disagreements over the Middle Eastern war have exposed deep divisions between the United States, Western Europe, and Turkey.[16] Some states fear escalation; others fear abandonment. The Alliance’s unity is real, but its cohesion is fragile. The European Union has made historic strides in defense cooperation, but its industrial base remains inadequate. Ammunition production goals have repeatedly slipped, and political disagreements have slowed decision‑making.[17] Europe talks about strategic autonomy, but it remains dependent on the United States for deterrence.

Amid this landscape of hesitation, five states stand out for their clarity, preparation, and resolve. Finland has transformed NATO’s northern flank. Its military is large, well‑trained, and deeply integrated into national society. Its reserves are robust, its civil defense infrastructure unmatched, and its political unity strong.[18] Finland does not rely on hope; it relies on preparation. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have been warning Europe about Russia for two decades and preparing for just as long. They have invested heavily in defense, built resilient cyber infrastructures, hardened critical systems, and integrated their militaries with NATO forces.[19] Their societies understand the stakes, and their governments act accordingly. Poland is now one of the most formidable militaries in Europe. It has invested aggressively in armor, artillery, air defense, and manpower.[20] Unlike 1939, Poland is not a speed bump; it is a fortress. Its strategic culture is sober, its threat perception accurate, and its commitment to Ukraine unwavering. These states are not the weak links in Europe’s defense. They are the anchors.

Moldova is the exception, the one state in Europe that is truly vulnerable. It lacks strategic depth, military capacity, and political cohesion. It faces a Russian‑backed separatist enclave, a hostile political opposition, and a constant barrage of disinformation.[21] If Russia destabilizes Moldova, the consequences will ripple across Romania, Ukraine, and the Black Sea region. Moldova needs protection, not symbolic support but real assistance: energy security, intelligence cooperation, cyber defense, and political backing.

The margin for error is closing. Russia’s intent is clear. Its capacity is degraded but sufficient. Its political system is hardened, not weakened. And the West’s resolve, the one variable that could decisively shape the outcome, is uncertain. Europe cannot afford uncertainty. The war in Ukraine is not a regional conflict; it is the opening chapter of a broader contest over the future of European security. If Ukraine falls, the Baltics will be next in line for pressure, Finland for hybrid attacks, and Moldova for destabilization. The parade in Moscow ends. The missiles do not. The question is whether the West will act before the next phase of this war expands the map of danger.

Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. He attended high school in Heinavesi, Finland. He spent most of his Marine Corps career as an operations chief, serving deployments in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. He serves as a Senior Fellow at the Patton Center for Peace and War at Norwich University. His published doctoral dissertation focuses on the role of ethnic Germans in early American history. His published works can be found in Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, Voices on Peace and War, and the Journal of the American Revolution.

[1] Security and Intelligence Service of the Republic of Moldova (SIS). Russian Influence Operations. Chișinău: SIS, 2025.

[2] “EU Warns Russia After Threats Over Baltic Airspace Dispute,” MSN, May 2026.

[3] Ibid.

[4] European External Action Service. Russian Interference in Moldova. Brussels: EEAS, 2025.

[5] Finnish Ministry of Defence. Hybrid Threats on the Nordic Frontier. Helsinki: Ministry of Defence of Finland, 2024.

[6] U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Russia Military Losses Assessment. Washington, DC: DIA, 2025.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Institute for the Study of War. Russian Defense Industrial Adaptation. Washington, DC: ISW, 2025.

[9] Pavel K. Baev, “Russia’s Nuclear Signaling,” Brookings Institution, 2024.

[10] European Court of Auditors. EU Defense Readiness. Luxembourg: European Court of Auditors, 2025.

[11] NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Impact of the Iran War on Alliance Cohesion. Riga: NATO StratCom COE, 2026.

[12] Institute for the Study of War. Russian Operational Adaptation. Washington, DC: ISW, 2025.

[13] Carnegie Moscow Center. Repression and Regime Stability. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2024.

[14] Center for Strategic and International Studies. Russia’s Sanctions Evasion Networks. Washington, DC: CSIS, 2025.

[15]NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Alliance Divisions Over the Iran Conflict. Riga: NATO StratCom COE, 2026.

[16] Ibid.

[17] European Defence Agency. Ammunition Production Gap. Brussels: European Defence Agency, 2025.

[18] Finnish Defence Forces. Annual Report 2025. Helsinki: Finnish Defence Forces, 2025.

[19] Baltic Defence College. Baltic Security Strategy. Tartu: Baltic Defence College, 2025.

[20] Polish Ministry of National Defence, “Force Modernization Plan,” 2025.

[21] Moldovan Security and Intelligence Service. Russian Influence Operations. Chișinău: SIS, 2025.

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku, Associate Director of the Peace and War Center, yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris Associate Professor of Philosophy, dmorris3@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. James Deitch, Senior Research Fellow, Peace and War Center

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

Russia’s Victory Day parade is designed to freeze time. Tanks roll across Red Square as if the past three years of war had been a pageant rather than a catastrophe. But this year’s choreography is not an end in itself. It is a curtain-raiser. The Kremlin is preparing to follow the symbolism of May 9 with the substance of a new summer offensive against Ukraine. The window to blunt that offensive—before it spills over into the Baltics, Moldova, or even Finland—is closing fast.

Kyiv understands this better than anyone. President Volodymyr Zelensky has warned European leaders and NATO that Russia is preparing a large-scale push in the coming months, despite heavy losses and a failure to secure decisive gains over the winter and early spring.[1] He has paired that warning with a blunt demand: accelerate deliveries of air-defense systems, especially Patriot batteries and interceptor missiles, or accept that Russia will be allowed to reshape the battlefield and the regional security order at missile range.[2]

The danger is not abstract. Ukraine’s proposal for a ceasefire during Russia’s war-commemoration period—beginning May 6 and extending through Victory Day—was met not with reciprocity but with more missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian cities.[3] Zelensky called Moscow’s insistence on parades while it continued to kill civilians a “strange and inappropriate” logic, a phrase that understates the cynicism of a regime that treats its own commemorations as cover for continued aggression.[4] The message from the Kremlin was unmistakable: there will be no pause, no humanitarian breathing space, and no respect for the symbolism of peace. There will be only the next phase of war.

For Ukraine, that next phase is likely to be a grinding summer campaign followed by another brutal winter of strikes on energy infrastructure. For Europe, it is something more dangerous still: the moment when the war ceases to be “over there” and becomes a live, proximate threat to NATO’s northeastern flank, to Moldova’s fragile sovereignty, and to Finland’s newly formalized role as the Alliance’s front‑line state.

Zelensky’s summer warning and the winter that follows

Zelensky’s recent appeals to Western leaders have been unusually explicit about timing. In conversations with European heads of government and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, he has warned that Russia is preparing a new offensive this summer, even as its forces admit in internal documents that they have failed to meet the objectives set by political leadership.[5] Russian units have bled for marginal gains around Avdiivka and elsewhere; the cost has been measured in thousands of casualties for a few ruined villages. Yet Moscow is still planning further offensive operations, betting that Western fatigue and distraction—especially the diversion of attention and munitions to the Middle East—will give it an opening.[6]

At the same time, Zelensky has pressed for a surge in air-defense systems to protect Ukraine’s energy grid ahead of another winter of intensive bombardment. The pattern is now familiar. When maneuvering on the front lines stalls, Russia turns to the systematic destruction of power plants, substations, and heating infrastructure, seeking to freeze Ukrainian cities into submission.[7] The Kremlin’s planners understand that winter has become a second front, where missiles and drones, not tanks, are the decisive weapons.

This is why Kyiv’s call for Patriot systems is not a luxury but a strategic necessity. Patriots are among the few widely produced systems capable of intercepting Russian ballistic missiles, including those targeting critical infrastructure.[8] Without them, Ukraine faces a double bind: a summer offensive that strains its ground forces and a winter campaign that targets its civilian resilience. With them, Ukraine can blunt both threats, preserving combat power at the front while keeping the lights on in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odesa.

The West’s response so far has been halting. Headlines about Ukraine pressing allies to speed up weapons deliveries ahead of the expected summer offensive capture the urgency but not yet the scale of what is required. The delay in providing long-range fires, air defense, and ammunition has already forced Ukraine into a defensive crouch in some sectors. If that delay continues into the summer, Russia will be able to dictate the tempo of operations, choosing when and where to escalate.

This is not just a Ukrainian problem. It is the precondition for a broader regional crisis.

The Baltic front that does not yet exist

The Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have spent the past four years living with the knowledge that Ukraine’s war is also a warning to them. They have been among Kyiv’s most committed supporters, providing aid well beyond what their size and GDP would suggest and pushing NATO to harden its eastern flank. Their leaders do not need to be convinced that a successful Russian offensive in Ukraine would embolden Moscow to test the Alliance elsewhere.

In recent months, that risk has shifted from theory to an explicit threat. Russian officials have warned that Baltic states that “aid Ukraine” could face consequences, including attacks on their territory.[9] These threats have been paired with a disinformation campaign accusing the Baltics of allowing their airspace to be used for Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil infrastructure in the Baltic Sea. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have denied these claims, noting that any airspace incursions have been accidental and often the result of Russian air-defense activity.[10]

The context matters. Ukraine has intensified drone attacks on Russian oil terminals at Ust-Luga and Primorsk to degrade the export infrastructure that funds Moscow’s war. Those strikes have already reduced shipments from Baltic ports and caused visible damage to key facilities.¹¹ Russia has responded not only with air defense measures but also with information operations designed to portray the Baltics as co-belligerents, thereby justifying future “retaliation.”

At the same time, Baltic leaders have been asking NATO for more permanent forces, more air-defense assets, and more robust contingency planning. Reports of drones striking oil tanks in Latvia and of Russian threats to attack Baltic states that facilitate Ukrainian operations have sharpened those demands. The Foreign Policy Research Institute has chronicled how four years of war have deepened Baltic solidarity with Ukraine while heightening their sense of vulnerability. They know that if Ukraine is forced into a bad peace or a frozen conflict on Russian terms, the Kremlin will not view that outcome as a limit but as an invitation.

The summer offensive, then, is not just about the Donbas or the Zaporizhzhia front. It is about whether Russia can create facts on the ground in Ukraine to later intimidate NATO’s smallest and most exposed members. A Russia that emerges from the summer with momentum will be more willing to probe Baltic airspace, stage “accidents” near critical infrastructure, and test the credibility of Article 5 through hybrid attacks that fall just below the threshold of open war.

Moldova: the soft underbelly

If the Baltics are NATO’s exposed flank, Moldova is Ukraine’s exposed flank. A small, poor, and politically fragile state wedged between Ukraine and Romania, Moldova has faced sustained Russian pressure since the full-scale invasion began. Moscow has used energy blackmail, disinformation, and the unresolved Transnistrian conflict to keep Chişinău off balance. It has also sought to exploit domestic polarization to derail Moldova’s European integration.

A renewed Russian offensive in southern Ukraine—especially one aimed at Mykolaiv, Odesa, or the coastal corridor—would immediately raise the stakes for Moldova. Even if Russian forces cannot realistically reach Transnistria in the near term, the threat of such a move would be enough to destabilize Moldovan politics and to force Chişinău into crisis mode. The Kremlin does not need to occupy Moldova to weaponize it; it only needs to keep it weak, divided, and fearful.

The coming summer offensive could serve as a pretext. If Russia claims new gains along the Black Sea littoral, it can revive its narrative of a “land bridge” to Transnistria and use it to justify increased covert activity inside Moldova. That might take the form of orchestrated protests, cyberattacks, or manufactured border incidents. It might also involve renewed efforts to interfere in Moldovan elections, portraying pro-European parties as warmongers dragging the country into conflict.

For the West, the lesson is straightforward. Supporting Ukraine’s defense in the south also helps defend Moldova’s sovereignty. Providing Chişinău with energy support, economic assistance, and help countering disinformation is not charity; it is a relatively low-cost investment in preventing the war from opening a new front.

Finland and the long border

Finland’s accession to NATO was among the most significant strategic consequences of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It transformed a 1,300-kilometer border from a bilateral Finnish-Russian concern into a NATO-Russian frontier. For Moscow, this was a self-inflicted wound. For the Alliance, it was a major gain in depth, geography, and capability.

But Finland’s new status also makes it a target. Russian officials have already signaled that they view NATO’s presence on the Finnish border as a provocation and have hinted at “military-technical” responses. These could include increased troop deployments near the border, more aggressive air and naval activity in the Baltic Sea, and intensified hybrid operations—cyberattacks, GPS jamming, and orchestrated migration flows—aimed at testing Helsinki’s resilience.

The connection to Ukraine’s summer offensive is indirect yet real. A Russia that believes it is winning in Ukraine will be more confident in escalating pressure on Finland, calculating that NATO will be reluctant to respond forcefully while it is still struggling to keep Ukraine in the fight. Conversely, a Russia that is checked or bloodied in Ukraine will have fewer resources and less political capital to devote to adventurism along the Finnish frontier.

Finland, for its part, has moved quickly to integrate into NATO planning and to strengthen its defenses. It has increased defense spending, deepened cooperation with Sweden and the Baltic states, and signaled that it will not be intimidated by Russian rhetoric. Yet even Finland’s formidable resilience has limits. If the war in Ukraine drags on under conditions favorable to Moscow, the cumulative pressure on Helsinki—and on the broader Nordic-Baltic region—will grow.

Diplomacy in the shadow of escalation

Against this backdrop, Ukraine’s diplomatic efforts take on added significance. The arrival of Ukraine’s top peace negotiator, Rustem Umerov, in Miami for talks with U.S. envoys signals strategic urgency, not capitulation. Kyiv is seeking to secure long-term security guarantees, defense-industrial cooperation, and financial support at the very moment Russia is preparing to test Western resolve on the battlefield.

These talks are unfolding alongside Ukraine’s push for a global peace summit and its efforts to rally support from countries beyond the traditional Euro-Atlantic community. Kyiv understands that any eventual settlement will be shaped not only by lines on the map but also by the balance of international opinion. It also understands that Russia will use any pause in fighting to rearm, regroup, and prepare for the next round.

That is why Zelensky’s rejection of Russia’s Victory Day ceasefire theatrics matters. When Moscow unilaterally declares a ceasefire for its own commemorations while continuing to strike Ukrainian cities, it is not offering peace; it is staging a performance for domestic and foreign audiences. Zelensky’s description of this as “strange and inappropriate” was diplomatic shorthand for something harsher: a refusal to legitimize a regime that treats ceasefires as propaganda tools rather than as steps toward genuine de-escalation.[11]

The West should take the same view. It should treat Russian talk of “pauses” and “truces” around symbolic dates with deep skepticism and judge Moscow by its actions, not its declarations. The real test of Russian intent will be what happens after the parade, not what is said during it.

What must be done before summer

The hard truth is that time is not neutral. Every week of delay in delivering air defense systems, artillery shells, and long-range fires to Ukraine is a week during which Russia can shape the conditions for its summer offensive. Every equivocation on sanctions enforcement or energy restrictions signals to Moscow that the West is not yet serious about constraining its war-making capacity.

A hard‑edged assessment leads to simple, if politically difficult, conclusions.

First, Ukraine must receive the air defense systems it has requested, in the quantities needed to protect both its cities and its front-line forces. Patriots, IRIS-T, NASAMS, and other systems are not interchangeable; each has a specific role in a layered defense. The West should treat the provision of these systems as a strategic priority, not a bargaining chip.

Second, ammunition and artillery production must be accelerated to a wartime footing. Ukraine cannot hold its lines, let alone regain territory, if it is outgunned three-to-one. European states have begun ramping up production, but the gap between pledges and deliveries remains large. Closing that gap before the summer offensive is essential.

Third, NATO’s eastern flank must be reinforced in ways that are visible to Moscow and reassuring to the Baltics and Finland. That means more forward-deployed units, more integrated air-defense networks, and more frequent exercises focused on rapid reinforcement. It also means clear public messaging that any attack—kinetic or hybrid—on Baltic or Finnish territory will be treated as an attack on the Alliance as a whole.

Fourth, Moldova must be integrated into a more coherent framework of Western support. That includes energy assistance, economic aid, and support to counter Russian disinformation and covert influence. It also includes contingency planning with Romania and other neighbors for scenarios in which Russia seeks to destabilize Moldova under cover of developments in southern Ukraine.

Finally, the United States and its European allies must recognize that the cost of preventing escalation now is far lower than the cost of responding to escalation later. The choice is not between “escalation” and “restraint,” but between shaping the battlefield in 2026 and reacting to a more dangerous one in 2027 or 2028.

The warning from the future

Four years of war in Ukraine have already transformed Europe’s security landscape. They have brought the Baltics and Poland to the center of strategic debate, pushed Finland and Sweden into NATO, and exposed vulnerabilities in Europe’s energy and defense-industrial systems. They have also revealed something about Russia’s political culture: its willingness to absorb losses, to weaponize history, and to treat neighboring states as expendable buffers.

The impending summer offensive, coming on the heels of Russia’s Victory Day parade, is not just another phase in a long war. It is a hinge. If Russia can seize the initiative, wear down Ukrainian forces, and survive another winter of sanctions and attrition, it will emerge more confident in its ability to coerce its neighbors and divide the West. If, instead, Ukraine can blunt the offensive, hold its lines, and protect its cities, the Kremlin will face a different calculus: a war it cannot win quickly, a society that is growing restless, and a NATO that has proven more resilient than expected.

President Zelensky’s warnings are not rhetorical flourishes. They are the distilled judgment of a leader who has watched Russia escalate at every opportunity and understands that the war’s center of gravity is shifting from “whether Ukraine survives” to “what kind of Europe emerges from this conflict.” His insistence on more air defenses, more ammunition, and more clarity from the West is, at root, a call for Europe not to sleepwalk into a wider war.

The Baltics, Moldova, and Finland are not bystanders in this story. They are the next chapters. If the West fails to act before the summer offensive, it may find itself reading those chapters sooner than expected.

The parade will end. The missiles will not. The only real question is whether the democracies that claim to uphold peace and security will act in time to prevent the next phase of this war from engulfing more of the map.

Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. He attended high school in Heinavesi, Finland. He spent most of his Marine Corps career as an operations chief, serving deployments in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. He serves as a Senior Fellow at the Patton Center for Peace and War at Norwich University. His published doctoral dissertation focuses on the role of ethnic Germans in early American history. His published works can be found in Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, Voices on Peace and War, and the Journal of the American Revolution.

[1] “Zelenskyy warns of Russian summer offensive, urges air defences,” MSN, accessed May 2026

[2] “Zelenskyy asks partners for air defense to protect energy infrastructure in winter and warns of Russian summer offensive – Bloomberg,” UNN (Kyiv), May 6, 2026

[3] “Zelenskyy warns of Russian summer offensive, urges air defences,” MSN

[4] “Zelenskiy says Russian war commemoration ceasefire shows ‘strange and inappropriate’ logic,” Reuters, May 2026.

[5] “Zelenskyy asks partners for air defense to protect energy infrastructure in winter and warns of Russian summer offensive – Bloomberg,” UNN

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] “Zelenskyy warns of Russian summer offensive, urges air defences,” MSN

[9] “EU warns Russia after threats over Baltic airspace dispute,” MSN, accessed May 2026.

[10] Ibid.

[11] “Zelenskiy says Russian war commemoration ceasefire shows ‘strange and inappropriate’ logic,” Reuters, May 2026

Evan McPherson, Class of 2026

My name is Evan McPherson, and I am a senior cadet in the class of ’26 and a soon-to-be graduate of the Military College of Vermont. This April, I was fortunate enough to be selected to represent Norwich, the Marine Corps, and the United States at the 2026 International Cadets Week, held at the Center for University Studies in Kosovo. Joining me and my classmate, Kenna McFadden ’29, were visiting cadets representing Albania, Turkey, Italy, and Canada. To me, this trip represented not only an opportunity to visit a part of the world I had never seen, but also a chance to learn about the resiliency of a people and culture in a newborn state.

I was struck by the generosity and hospitality of our Kosovar hosts and the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) in general. In the words of one of the KSF officers: “Kosovo is a poor country.” For context, Kosovo has one of the highest unemployment rates of any European country, at nearly 10.8%. Despite this, in all of my travel experience, I have yet to meet a people so eager to pay for a guest’s meal. I was even offered free coffee at a restaurant simply for being an American. It was only on the last day of our trip that I truly understood where this hospitality stemmed from. While visiting a museum and historic household in the capital, Pristina, our guide explained: “For us, our homes first belong to God, second to our guests, and lastly to ourselves.” While this hospitality is primarily cultural, I also believe it stems from the fact that, until relatively recently, Kosovo was a state imbued in conflict. In my opinion, the generosity of the people represents both their heritage and their drive to develop and display the homeland they are so proud of. Out of all the sights, activities, and foods, this single attribute resonates with me the most.

In an educational context, this trip served as an incredible experience, both in observing how a nation’s economy and identity develop post-conflict and in realizing how vital something as simple as friendship is to international military cooperation. The majority of Kosovars are ethnically Albanian and Muslim; however, Kosovo is a secular country with a sense of religious harmony that, in my opinion, is greater than that of the U.S. The pride of the people is also visible in the professionalism of their armed forces, the Kosovo Security Force. If I had to describe one key takeaway from my trip that I will use in my future military career, it would be the importance of cultural intelligence to military leadership. Operating in any theater and being oblivious to the culture of the people or history of the places puts a leader at a disadvantage, both at a tactical level and a interpersonal one. As I transition from University to the fleet, I will carry this global perspective with me, ensuring that the leadership choices I make always remember the human and cultural elements often overlooked in modern, high-tempo, operations. Ultimately, this trip demonstrated that one of the most important tools for international cooperation is the genuine connection formed not just in classrooms, but in experiencing the uniqueness of one another’s culture.

Kenna McFadden, Class of 2029

This past month, I was given the incredible opportunity to travel to the nation of Kosovo as a participant in the Kosovo Defense Academy’s International Cadets Week 2026. Experiencing a society of such great kindness and fortitude was nothing short of inspiring.

As a Freshman cadet, my experience with U.S. military culture has been limited, yet I have noticed a pattern of disconnection among young members who feel distant from our nation’s purpose and objectives in defense. Over the course of this trip, I have been reminded of the weight morale and commonality carry in forging successful troops.

As a representative of Norwich University, Norwich University’s Peace and War Center, the United States Navy, and the United States as a whole, I was privileged to stay at the Kosovo Defense Academy in Pristina, Kosovo, for a week. I stayed alongside cadets from military academies in Albania, Turkey, Italy, and Canada. Immediately, I began to recognize the importance of cultural competence in real time as we all interacted to learn about the unique military training, traditions, language, etc., that were specific to us. At the same time, we found commonalities that brought us together regardless of global position.

As we were introduced to the cadets at the Kosovo Defense Academy, I noted that Kosovo trains its officers not only to be extremely disciplined and physically fit, but also to place strong emphasis on history and community, fostering a strong sense of morale. Every cadet I met had a personal family connection to the recent war in Kosovo, which ended in 1999, and each told me a detailed account of their nation’s history, sharing interesting facts and moving stories in every conversation. The deep inspiration that they all felt to serve their country was palpable. They were each well educated and passionate about the strength of their military and their hopes for contributing to Kosovo’s continued recovery from the war.

Throughout the week, I was given multiple opportunities to see the pain that Kosovo and its people had endured. We first toured the Reporting House in Pristina, a museum of artifacts collected from the war. We then visited the Jashari family memorial site, which serves as a reminder of the momentous sacrifice one family made to push their nation toward independence. Lastly, we went inside the Ethnological Museum of Pristina to observe collections that preserve Kosovo’s history and culture. Although each site was emotionally moving, our visits had an uplifting effect because we were fortunate to observe the resilience and passion that the people of Kosovo share. I was incredibly impressed with the strength, kindness, and morale of the citizens and soldiers across the nation. Their shared outlook continues to motivate them to build a better future for themselves, their families, and their country.

This trip was an unmistakable reminder of the importance of common passion and morale in national culture, but especially in military initiatives. I have learned how essential it is that future military officers of the United States keep their shared goals in mind, learn about their country’s history, and connect both themselves and the troops they lead to the goals of their military. There are clearly many lessons that we can learn from our allies, and I am grateful to have been apart of that on this trip.

Students participated in advanced, real-world analysis of the ongoing Iran conflict using Seerist, an AI-driven risk intelligence platform that combines large-scale data analysis with expert insight to forecast emerging global threats and support strategic decision-making, focusing on conflict dynamics, emerging risks, and forward-looking projections within an intelligence-style framework.

Key Experiences

Applied Intelligence & Expert Engagement: Students engaged directly with professionals possessing extensive experience in intelligence and national security, enhancing both the rigor and realism of their analytical approach. Students received constructive, high-level feedback from senior industry professionals, including individuals with high-ranking intelligence backgrounds.

Strategic Communication & Presentation Skills: Students developed advanced presentation competencies, including audience awareness, strategic use of notes, and explicit alignment with evaluation criteria and rubrics.

Technology Integration & Analytical Tool Use: Students leveraged multiple analytical tools, including Seerist, to support their analyses, demonstrating technical proficiency to both Seerist personnel and evaluators.

Collaborative Problem Solving & Analytical Integration: Students worked effectively as a team on a complex, multifaceted problem set, dividing analytical responsibilities while maintaining a cohesive and integrated final product.

Faculty Development: The experience expanded faculty engagement with Seerist and industry judges, strengthened institutional visibility for Norwich University, and supported continued development of mentorship strategies—particularly in balancing pre-event guidance with allowing students to learn through evaluation—while also enhancing professional exposure within applied intelligence spaces.

Summary

During the Seerist Intellithon, four students (Justin Agri, Grace Davie, Tori Jarvis, Jayden LaVecchia) were mentored by Dr. McGarry through the development and delivery of a high-level analytical briefing addressing the ongoing conflict in Iran. The team produced a presentation that combined strong substantive knowledge with a high degree of professionalism

Students presented to a panel of industry judges, including individuals who previously served as Deputy Directors within intelligence divisions at the CIA. Feedback from both judges and Seerist personnel indicated that the team’s analysis was particularly strong in depth, clarity, and overall execution.

The experience also reinforced the importance of explicitly aligning presentations with rubric criteria, even when analytical quality is high, serving as a key professional takeaway. While the team did not secure first place, they demonstrated a high level of capability, professionalism, and intellectual engagement, reflecting positively on their preparation and future potential.

Beyond the competition, students engaged in meaningful networking with judges and Seerist personnel. These interactions focused on future opportunities, skill development, and professional positioning, highlighting the value of the experience beyond the formal event.

Dr. Presley McGarry is an Assistant Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Norwich University, currently in her second year. She teaches courses in professionalism in criminal justice, introductory and advanced research methods, senior seminar, and a Seerist certificate course. Dr. McGarry holds a PhD and Master’s in Criminology and Criminal Justice from UMass Lowell, along with a Bachelor’s in Psychology from the University of Nebraska–Lincoln.

Dr. McGarry’s research focuses on the biosocial factors underlying antisocial and deviant behavior. Specifically, she explores how psychological and physiological processes—such as autonomic nervous system function—interact to shape emotional regulation, susceptibility to cognitive biases, and stress responses, particularly in the context of misinformation, disinformation, and online radicalization. By examining the mind-body connection through tools like EEG and ECG, Dr. McGarry investigates how these physiological processes might contribute to an individual’s response to social stimuli and risk-taking behaviors. Her work also involves the use of an AI-based Natural Language Processing model to analyze the rhetoric and influence of mis/disinformation online. In addition, Dr. McGarry leads a joint initiative on democratic resilience with Helmuth Schmidt University through Norwich’s Peace and War Center, where she develops research and think pieces on sustaining democratic systems amidst challenges such as misinformation and political polarization.

In her interdisciplinary work, Dr. McGarry has managed several federally funded research projects from agencies like the DOD, ARI, and AFOSR, contributing to the development of new methodologies for understanding the intersections of psychology, physiology, and illicit behavior. She has rebranded and led a university lab focused on these topics and has published over a dozen articles on issues such as misinformation, radicalism, and military decision-making. Outside of work, Dr. McGarry is a devoted servant to Wednesday, her Siamese cat, and Asparagus, her leopard gecko.

International Forum on Peace, Security, and Prosperity (IFPSP)

22-25 MAR 2026| Palermo, Sicily

Mission: The IFPSP was founded in 2019 to educate global youth about the challenges of building and maintaining peace, security, and prosperity within liberal democracies in the digital age. The Forum brings civilian youth together with Officer Cadets to explore the role of our militaries in the peace making, peace building and sustaining activities.

Learn more

Sawyer Hernandez

I traveled to Palermo, Italy as part of a Norwich University delegation attending the International Forum on Peace, Security, and Prosperity (IFPSP). The delegation consisted of six cadets, and for me, this experience was particularly meaningful as it was my first time traveling abroad in an academic setting with peers, aside from a prior military trip to Macedonia. Traveling with Norwich and engaging alongside other students fundamentally changed how I viewed international experiences.

The forum itself was structured as a four-night, three-day conference. The first evening began with a reception, followed by two days of panels, workshops, and collaborative discussions. The primary focus centered on leadership development, particularly resilience and emotional intelligence. One of the most significant takeaways for me was the concept of multi-domain resilience--understanding that resilience is not simply a personal trait, but a strategic asset that must be developed across psychological, informational, and organizational domains, especially in an era shaped by cognitive and information warfare.

While the conference was formally organized, what stood out most was how informal and relationship-driven the experience became. Rather than focusing heavily on rigid geopolitical debate, the forum emphasized dialogue, connection, and shared understanding among participants from different countries.

This image reflects the informal side of the experience, where relationship-building and social interaction played a central role in developing trust and connection among the conference participants.

This experience will significantly impact my development as a leader by reinforcing the importance of adaptability in communication and engagement, I entered the forum expecting structured, potentially contentious discussions on contemporary geopolitical issues; however, I quickly realized that effective collaboration across cultures requires a different approach.

I observed clear differences in communication styles. I found myself to be more direct and relaxed, while others--particularly participants from Germany and Sweden--demonstrated a more formal and measured approach. Rather than forcing my style, I worked to meet people where they were, adjusting my tone and delivery to better align with their expectations while still maintaining authenticity.

In many of the group discussions, I naturally assumed the role of facilitator. While I was not necessarily the most knowledgeable person in the room, I often had the confidence to initiate dialogue, keep conversations moving, and ensure all voices were included. This experience reinforced an important leadership lesson: effective leadership is not about dominating discussion, but about enabling others to contribute.

Additionally, I became acutely aware that I was not the smartest person in the room--and that was one of the most valuable aspects of the experience. It pushed me to listen more intentionally, prioritize understanding over speaking, and recognize the depth of knowledge others brought to the table.

This image represents structured collaboration, where diverse perspectives were brought together to address complex problems through dialogue and mutual respect.

One of the most impactful moments of the trip occurred during a conversation with a member of the British delegation, Rabab, a Cambridge RAF student of Moroccan descent.

This image captures the conclusion of that interaction. What appears to be a simple handshake actually represents a meaningful intellectual exchange. During our conversation, we discussed U.S. foreign policy and the future of NATO. I initially argued in favor of the importance of a rules-based international order, while she countered with the perspective that such an order is already largely illusory.

She articulated her position with a level of clarity and depth that ultimately led me to concede the argument. That moment--captured in the handshake--symbolized mutual respect, intellectual humility, and the value of being challenged.

This interaction reinforced that leadership is not about always being correct, but about being willing to engage, listen, and adapt when presented with stronger perspectives. It also demonstrated that disagreement, when conducted respectfully, can lead to meaningful understanding rather than division.

Beyond the conference, Palermo itself provided a powerful cultural experience.

The statue of Neptune, located in the Palermo Botanical Gardens, represents the deep historical and mythological roots embedded within the city. Palermo’s architecture and public spaces reflect centuries of layered influence--Norman, Roman, African, and Mediterranean--which made the city feel both historically dense and culturally diverse.

This sense of history was further reinforced through experiences such as visiting the catacombs, where it became clear that Palermo is not only an old city, but one that has carried significance and continuity across generations.

This image captures a religious procession leading up to Easter, depicting a reenactment of Christ’s crucifixion. While my group initially reacted with some discomfort due to the graphic nature of the display, I found the experience deeply compelling. It was a vivid example of how cultural and religious traditions remain actively integrated into daily life.

Seeing the level of detail, investment, and community participation highlighted how deeply these traditions matter to the local population. It reinforced the idea that culture is not abstract--it is lived, visible, and often deeply emotional.

Throughout the trip, I spent a significant amount of time with members of my delegation, particularly close friends from Norwich. These informal moments--whether at dinners or social gatherings--were just as impactful as the formal sessions. These interactions allowed us to reflect on our experiences, share perspectives, and recognize how similar we were to the individuals we met from other countries. Despite different national backgrounds, there was a clear commonality in our interests, values, and motivations.

This realization challenged my preconceived notions about cultural differences. While I initially expected more rigidity or separation, I found that we were far more similar than different--especially as young leaders preparing for similar roles. The Palermo experience fundamentally reshaped my perspective on leadership, communication, and cultural understanding. It reinforced that effective leadership requires empathy, adaptability, and the ability to recognize shared humanity across diverse groups.

If I were to summarize the value of this experience, it would be this: exposure to different perspectives reduces intellectual narrowness and forces growth. It becomes immediately clear how limited a single perspective can be, and how much can be gained by actively listening to others. Moving forward, I will prioritize empathy and intentional listening in my leadership approach. Understanding that there is a commonality in every person--and leveraging that understanding--will allow me to lead more effectively in diverse and complex environments.

Cadet Forrester Belanger NU 26’, SWAP and History

From March 20 to March 27, 2026, I traveled to Palermo, Italy, as part of a ten-cadet delegation from Norwich University to participate in the International Forum on Peace, Security, and Prosperity (IFPSP). The forum, themed “Creating Adaptive Forces: Building Military Resilience in a Changing International Landscape,” provided the opportunity to explore “multi-domain resilience,” the idea that resilience is a strategic asset developed across psychological, informational, and organizational domains. I was also able to present a poster focused on the History of Alliance-Building and partner-building by US Special Forces in the Pacific. Beyond the formal panels, the experience was defined by cultural immersion, including navigating the historic winding streets of Palermo, visiting the centuries-old catacombs, and observing a truly unique religious procession leading up to Easter.

This experience significantly advanced my leadership development by forcing me to confront the visceral reality of American hegemony. As the only American in many small working groups, I realized that my international peers looked to me to bear the mantle of leadership and settle disputes. I also had to navigate negative stereotypes of Americans as “loud” or “bombastic,” leaning into a more reserved, facilitative style that prioritized intentional listening over dominating the discussion. I learned that effective leadership in a diverse environment is about enabling others to contribute to the benefit of the whole team.

A pivotal cross-cultural exchange occurred during a gathering at the Italian Army Club, where I engaged in an “impromptu summit” with cadets from South Africa, the United Kingdom, and various European nations. We discussed a wide variety of topics, ranging from the South African cadets’ concerns about their nation’s shift toward BRICS to European anxieties regarding the future of NATO and the possibility of U.S. forces being drawn away to the Middle East or China. By clarifying the U.S. lawmaking process, our governmental system, and our strategic focus on China, I was able to calm their concerns and work towards mutual understanding. I was also able to make a personal connection with Cadet Måna Almgren from the Swedish Delegation, who agreed to show me around Stockholm when I visit there this summer. We also discussed the role that Chinese information warfare is spreading into the North Sea over the past few years and how the Swedes have been trying to handle it.

Cadet Jaimey DiNapoli

During my time in Palermo for the International Forum on Peace, Security, and Prosperity, I was able to gain valuable new insight and perspective to a wide range of cultures and viewpoints. The conference itself offered many interesting topics of discussion, ranging from resilience to emotional intelligence that were discussed in panels and workshops. However, what I found more impactful than the sessions were the relationships we were able to build with international cadets from a myriad of different countries.

An interaction that stood out to me was when we were all trading patches and other regalia. Despite our different nationalities, I made strong connections with two cadets in the British Navy, and we plan on keeping in touch and hopefully planning a visit on the coming months. It felt so natural to talk with them about their experiences and be able to compare and contrast and gain a deeper understanding of how their system works. I found it very easy to strike up a conversation with the other cadets despite having no previous interaction because of the similarities of our backgrounds. Our delegation had brought rook covers to trade, and it was such a unique experience to see so many international cadets wandering the streets of Palermo in their newly acquired rook hats. It struck me how similar the majority of cadets were to my peers at Norwich. A major similarity was that everyone I talked to was the mindset we all seemed to have. There was a mutual understanding that although choosing the military is not a common decision, we all understand the gravity of the roles we will be entering as, and respect international military force for sharing the same values and viewpoints while recognizing cultural differences and how they impact military decisions. Understanding the mechanics of other militaries plays a very big part in being able to maintain alliances and demonstrating cross cultural understanding.

As I move forward in my military career, I know this forum and the opportunities it gave me to meet and make connections with other cadets will allow me to be a more informed and effective leader in the future along with the deeper understanding and appreciation I fostered for the importance of cohesion and working for peace.

Cadet Elizabeth Howl ‘27, Nursing

Takeaway: My experience at the International Forum on Peace, Security & Prosperity in Palermo, Sicily fundamentally shifted how I understand intercultural communication. Engaging with Cadets from Ireland, Britain, France, Canada, and many other nations made it clear that even among close allies, our lived experiences and values differ in ways that are difficult to appreciate from a distance. Hearing how others navigate challenges unique to their countries forced me to examine my own assumptions and recognize how privileged I have been in my opportunities as an American Cadet.

These conversations will directly shape how I practice as a future Army nurse. Effective nursing requires the ability to meet each patient where they are and understand how their culture and beliefs influence their care. The forum reinforced that cultural humility is not a soft skill but a competency that can be applied in any field.

Perhaps the most lasting takeaway was a deepened appreciation for human connection across difference. Spending time with Cadets from around the world reminded me that trust is built gradually through genuine curiosity and shared experience. I am grateful to have represented the United States in that setting and humbled by what I received in return. I carry those friendships and perspectives into my growth as both an officer and a future nurse.

We left on the afternoon of 20 March and landed around noon on the 21st. Our first day was an experience in familiarization and adaptation to the new environment. Palermo is a very different environment compared to almost every American city, with winding streets, old buildings, and beautiful architecture. In many of my subsequent explorations of the city, I would emerge from narrow alleys into wide plazas bordering centuries-old churches or palaces. After eating along the main tourist artery, my friend and I broke off to explore the shops and waterfront. The first full day in Palermo was a sharp departure from the United States as we ate a wonderful breakfast from the hotel staff and then ventured out into the city for more sightseeing. On our way, we would run into a huge flea market where everything from old DVDs and video games to fine china was being haggled over by tourists and locals alike. Pushing south, we would make our way to the city’s gardens while observing the wonderful architecture. That evening, we would mingle in the rain with foreign cadets for the first time and make several contacts that would form the basis of friendships throughout the conference. The next day, we began the conference and engaged in meaningful exchanges with foreign cadets, discussing various questions regarding resilience. That evening, we would go out on the town and explore the city’s nightlife. The second day would focus much more on adapting to changing circumstances, with several moral quandaries. That evening, we would attend an event at the Italian Army Club, where we could break down barriers and be more casual with our counterparts. The final day of the conference was dedicated to a speech from Lt. General Broadmeadow and closing remarks. That evening, there was an impromptu celebration and goodbye among all the cadets in town. Thursday saw us explore many different parts of the city, including the catacombs, which were a centuries-old mortuary. We would have a small celebration to commemorate ring night, but would otherwise prepare to return home. The next day, we would return to the United States bright and early, eventually returning to campus around 2000 on the 27th.

The biggest thing I took away from this trip is the new perspective I gained as an American officer and what it meant: every time we were put into groups, I was generally the lone American. The cadets at the event looked to me for leadership. Never before have I seen such a visceral projection of American hegemony and leadership. I realized that an American officer must be able to bear the mantle among our international peers, settling disputes and fostering collective leadership. While this was a positive example of how the rest of the world views Americans, they also had many negative stereotypes that were projected onto me as well. Americans are seen as loud, culturally insensitive, bombastic, and rash. This was strange for someone like me, who is much more reserved and quiet. I found that leaning into the stereotypes to be self-aware or to take some of these stereotypes in stride when interacting with foreign cadets.

While we were at the Italian army club party, I had a very in-depth conversation with the south ’fricans (British pronunciation), Brits, and some Europeans. We essentially split off for about forty-five minutes to share our different geopolitical outlooks on the world and came away with some interesting information. During the impromptu summit, we discussed many topics, with African politics being the first, which we were all very interested in. The South Africans stated that they wanted to remain neutral but felt that their nation was shifting toward the revisionist powers and BRICS because of the ANC and its much more authoritarian behavior of late. They have a much different approach to global politics, with much more of a focus on Africa (surprising, right) and on peacekeeping. They were very concerned about the expansion of terrorism in Africa and how US-China competition would affect these groups. The Europeans were very concerned that US forces would be drawn away from the Russian border to the Middle East and about the future of NATO. It was good to explain to them some of the American concerns from an American perspective,, the main one being China. Also, the Europeans do not have a good understanding of domestic politics or how our lawmaking process works, so my clarification calmed them down some (they were very nervous about the US pulling out of NATO abruptly).

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku, Associate Director of the Peace and War Center, yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris Associate Professor of Philosophy, dmorris3@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. James Deitch, Senior Research Fellow, Peace and War Center

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

Introduction

Since the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, the United States has been embroiled in a series of wars, interventions, and strategic realignments that have defined its role as a global power. Yet beneath the surface of American military and diplomatic activity lies a persistent structural weakness: the absence of a coherent, enduring Grand National Strategy. Over the past forty years, U.S. strategy has been shaped less by long-term vision than by the shifting tides of presidential administrations, congressional control, and partisan politics. This instability has jeopardized international alliances, undermined trust in American power, and destabilized both domestic and global economies. As the United States faces new threats—from the rise of China to the resurgence of Russia, and the challenges of the Global War on Terror (GWOT)—the need for a cohesive, non-partisan grand strategy has never been more urgent.

Middle East Wars and Strategic Incoherence

The Middle East has been the crucible of American strategic failure and inconsistency. From the Iran hostage crisis to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. policy has oscillated between interventionism, containment, and withdrawal. The Gulf War of 1991, launched to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, was hailed as a model of decisive action and coalition leadership. Yet the subsequent wars in Iraq (2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-2021) revealed the limits of American power and the dangers of strategic incoherence.

Paul D. Miller’s analysis of the Afghanistan war underscores the consequences of shifting priorities and contradictory goals. Miller argues that American defeat in Afghanistan was not inevitable but the result of a cumulative series of strategic errors, bureaucratic dysfunctions, and political vacillations spanning four presidencies. Each administration—Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden—made pivotal decisions that contributed to the mission’s unraveling, as the United States repeatedly oscillated among counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, state-building, and rapid disengagement.[i] The central tragedy, Miller contends, is that the U.S. failed not at warfighting but at statecraft, never building the political foundations necessary for enduring success.[ii]

The Iraq War further illustrates the dangers of strategic drift. The initial invasion in 2003 was justified by claims of weapons of mass destruction and the promise of democratization. Yet the absence of a clear post-war plan, the failure to anticipate sectarian violence, and the rapid turnover of political leadership within Iraq led to years of instability and conflict. The Obama administration’s withdrawal in 2011, followed by the rise of ISIS and renewed intervention, exemplifies the cyclical nature of American engagement in the region.

The Global War on Terror and Policy Shifts

The GWOT, launched in response to the September 11 attacks, has been marked by a series of shifting strategies and priorities. The initial focus on Afghanistan and al-Qaeda soon expanded to Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and beyond. Drone strikes, special operations, and targeted killings became central tools of American policy, yet the lack of a coherent grand strategy led to mission creep, legal ambiguity, and diplomatic fallout.

Andrew J. Bacevich’s critique of American militarism highlights the dangers of overreach and ideological distortion. Bacevich argues that the United States is seduced by the idea of military solutions, driven by civil-military romanticism, evangelical narratives, neoconservative ideology, and public disengagement from the costs of war.[iii] The result is repeated intervention, unrealistic goals, and a political environment in which leaders promise decisive outcomes that the military cannot deliver.[iv] This environment fosters economic instability, as military spending and interventionist policies fluctuate with political cycles, undermining both domestic fiscal discipline and global economic confidence.

Policy Toward Europe: From Alliance Leadership to Strategic Ambiguity

U.S. policy toward Europe has undergone dramatic shifts over the past four decades. The end of the Cold War brought hopes of a “peace dividend” and the expansion of NATO, yet recent years have seen a retreat from traditional commitments and growing uncertainty about American leadership. The Obama administration’s cautious response to Russian aggression in Ukraine, the Trump administration’s ambivalent stance toward NATO, and the Biden administration’s renewed support for Ukraine all reflect the absence of a consistent grand strategy.

James M. Deitch’s analysis of U.S. policy toward Russia and Ukraine shows how cumulative choices shaped Russian expectations and negotiation leverage. Deitch treats U.S. policy as a signaling system, showing how restraint, inconsistency, escalation, and accommodation collectively created a strategic environment that Moscow learned to exploit.[v] The lesson is clear: deterrence is not abstract but communicative, and adversaries calibrate their strategies to American thresholds.[vi] The lack of coherent signaling and sustained commitment has undermined alliance trust and emboldened adversaries.

The Trump Doctrine: America First and the New Monroe Doctrine

The Trump administration marked a radical departure from previous U.S. strategy, embracing an “America First” approach and a new iteration of the Monroe Doctrine. This policy prioritized American interests, withdrew from traditional commitments to Europe and Japan, and sought to recalibrate U.S. engagement in the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia.

The shifts in U.S. policy toward Ukraine, Taiwan, Venezuela, Cuba, and the Middle East reflect a broader shift in grand strategy. While identifying China as the number one global threat, the Trump administration simultaneously appeased Russia, withdrew from multilateral agreements, and emphasized bilateral deals. The prioritization of American interests over alliance commitments has raised questions about the sustainability of this strategy and its consequences for global stability.

Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich’s historical analysis underscores the plurality of American strategy, showing that no single “American way” dominates all eras.[vii] The coexistence of multiple “ways of war,” shaped by era, region, technology, and political context, is not a strength but a symptom of the absence of grand strategy.[viii] The United States’ inability to sustain a coherent strategic vision undermines its ability to project power, protect allies, and ensure international peace.

The Challenge of China and the Limits of Strategic Realignment

The rise of China as a global power has forced the United States to reassess its strategic priorities. While successive administrations have identified China as the primary threat to American interests, the absence of a grand strategy has led to inconsistent policies and missed opportunities. The Trump administration’s trade war, the Biden administration’s focus on Indo-Pacific alliances, and ongoing debates over Taiwan and the South China Sea reflect the challenges of strategic realignment.

At the same time, appeasing Russia and retreating from traditional commitments to Europe and Japan have weakened the credibility of American power. The prioritization of “America First” may not be sustainable, and its survival beyond the Trump administration is uncertain. The risk is that the United States will continue to oscillate between competing priorities, undermining its ability to lead and protect its allies.

Toward a Cohesive, Non-Partisan Grand Strategy

The lessons of the past forty years are clear: the absence of a grand strategy has jeopardized American power, alliances, and economic stability. The United States must develop a cohesive, nonpartisan grand strategy that stands apart from electoral cycles and party platforms. This strategy should prioritize clear signaling, sustained commitment, and the integration of military, diplomatic, and economic tools.

A grand strategy must be grounded in long-term vision, not short-term political gain. It should recognize the interconnectedness of global threats, the importance of alliances, and the need for credible deterrence. The United States must move beyond the cycles of intervention and withdrawal, embrace strategic clarity, and restore trust in its leadership.

Conclusion

The United States stands at a crossroads. The wars of the past forty years, shifts in policy toward Europe, the GWOT, and the Trump Doctrine have exposed the dangers of strategic incoherence and partisan politics. As China rises and Russia exploits American ambiguity, the need for a grand strategy has never been more urgent. The United States must develop a cohesive, enduring vision that transcends party platforms and electoral cycles, restores trust in its power, and ensures international peace and stability.

Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. During his Marine Corps career, he deployed to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. His published works can be found in USNI’s Proceedings, Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, and the Journal of the American Revolution.

[i] Paul D. Miller, Choosing Defeat: The Twenty-Year Saga of How America Lost Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2025).

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[iv] Ibid.

[v] James M. Deitch, “Signals and Consequences: How U.S. Policy Shaped Russian Strategy and Negotiation Leverage in Ukraine, 2014-2025,” Journal of Peace and War, January 2026.

[vi] Ibid.

[vii] Matthew S. Muehlbauer and David J. Ulbrich, Ways of War: American Military History from the Colonial Era to the Twenty-First Century (New York: Routledge, 2014).

[viii] Ibid.

The 7th Peace and War Summit at Norwich University will bring together scholars, policymakers, military professionals, and students to explore the evolving dynamics of conflict, governance, and great power rivalry across Africa. This year’s summit will address a broad spectrum of interrelated issues shaping the continent’s stability and development. Topics include ongoing intrastate and interstate conflicts; the rise of transnational terrorist networks; and the persistent challenges of corruption and weak governance.

The summit will also examine the profound effects of climate change and migration, economic development, human rights violations, and public health crises on regional security. Finally, it will consider the expanding geopolitical influence of China and Russia, alongside U.S. engagement and policy toward Africa. Through interdisciplinary dialogue and critical analysis, the Summit aims to foster deeper understanding and generate innovative ideas for advancing sustainable peace and security across the continent.

Monday, March 23

Welcome Remarks and Keynote Address
9-9:50 a.m.

Welcome Remarks: Dr. Lea M. Williams, Provost and Dean of the Faculty

Keynote remarks: Ambassador Mohamed Fathi Ahmed Edrees, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations

Panel Session I
10-10:50 a.m.

Student Moderators: David Nziza and Holly Smith

Presenters:
Dr. Christopher Faulkner
Delegating Force: Private Military and Security Companies and the Evolving Landscape of Security Force Assistance in Africa
Dr. Ebenezer Obadare
Terrorism and Contemporary Geopolitics: West Africa and Beyond

Panel Session II
11-11:50 a.m.

Student Moderators: Godfrey Delaney and Emma Drake

Presenters:
Dr. Yonatan Morse
The Electoral and Historical Roots of Healthcare Reform in Africa: Comparing Ghana and Senegal
Dr. Claudine Kuradusenge-McLeod
Peace Without Trust: How Diaspora Politics Impacted Understanding of the DRC-Rwanda-U.S. Peace Agreement

Panel Session III
1-1:50 p.m.

Student Moderators: Jasmin Sackey and Austin Garcia

Presenters:
Mr. Fadji Kumapley
Factors and Developments Shaping Great Power Competition in Africa
Dr. Vitaly Kozyrev and Mr. Rachid Sow
In Search of New Security and Modernization Eco Systems: the Role of China and Russia in West Africa

Panel Session IV
2-2:50 p.m.

Student Moderators: Stephanie Unuane and Hector Aponte

Presenters:
Dr. Josh Regan
Declining Economics, Illegal Fishing, and State Weakness: The Three-Pillar Threat to Somalia’s Piracy Problem
Dr. Robert VandenBerg
Preparing for an African Future

Student Panel Session I
3-4:30 p.m.

Moderator:
Dr. Steven Sodergren
Discussants:
Dr. Cevat Dargin

Presenters:
Tom Besser
Africa on the Periphery: America’s New Mercantile Realism and Its Impact on African Geopolitics
Zaleigh Hornsey
ISIS and the Exploitation of Islam
Kristin Sanderson
Holodomor: Crimes of Cultural Genocide

Tuesday, March 24

Roundtable Discussion I: Challenges and Complexities in Africa
9:30-10:45 a.m.

Chair: Dr. Emily Gray
Panelists:
Claudine Kuradusenge-McLeaod, Yonatan Morse, Ebenezer Obadare, Rachid Sow

Roundtable Discussion II: Great Power Rivalry and U.S. Strategy Toward Africa
11 a.m.-12:15 p.m.

Chair: Dr. Rowland Brucken
Panelists:
Christopher Faulkner, Vitaly Kozyrev, Fadji Kumapley, Joshua Regan, Robert VandenBerg

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku, Associate Director of the Peace and War Center, yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris Associate Professor of Philosophy, dmorris3@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. James Deitch, Senior Research Fellow, Peace and War Center

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

When the European empires, alongside the United States, engineered the modern Middle East after World War I, they swept aside the Kurds, along with other ethno-religious communities deemed undeserving of statehood, writing them out of the region’s political architecture. Since then, and until very recently, the Kurds have mainly appeared as problems to be managed or security threats to be eliminated to maintain mandate regimes and successor nation-states within an ideologically divided world order. As European colonial empires and the Cold War security order collapsed and the war on terror reshaped American priorities in the region, the Kurds have steadily reemerged onto the Middle Eastern political scene. The political limbo that offered neither the autonomy of Soviet nationalities nor the sovereignty enjoyed by post-colonial states allows the Kurds to play roles that are contingent, evolving, and closely tied to the uncertain political trajectories of the region. The ongoing U.S.–Israeli war with Iran only heightens this dynamic, elevating the Kurds’ strategic importance even as the regional order forged in the aftermath of World War I appears increasingly fragile.

Yet they have become significant actors not only within and across the political boundaries that divide them, but also in shaping the trajectory of America’s Middle East policy. The Kurds’ aspirations for sovereignty, defined less by formal statehood than by the capacity to govern and defend their own communities within existing states, have repeatedly converged with American strategic and security interests in the region, compelling these unlikely partners to work together time and again. This relationship has been romanticized as a passionate love affair, defined by cycles of devotion, betrayal, separation, and reunion, intense enough to provoke jealousy among neighboring states and regional actors that have long competed to claim the Kurds as their own.

What does this unlikely partnership reveal about the changing political order of the Middle East? What appears in the Kurdish case as a political ambiguity or even anomaly reflects a broader regional pattern that now defines the Middle East. This is evident in the recurring tendency of politicians, think tank analysts, and academics to present the region as “new,” suggesting a widespread belief that it is undergoing fundamental transformation.[i] Yet this reinvention is rarely viewed from the vantage point of the Kurds’ changing roles, despite their growing significance to the region’s future and to America’s expanding role within it. Once relegated to the margins of a fragmented Middle East, the Kurds now occupy an unprecedented strategic position.

America’s Unlikely Partners: The Kurds

The Kurds have emerged as critical actors in the fight against jihadist organizations such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. They are poised to play a fundamental role in reshaping Iran’s political landscape, much as Kurdish actors helped shape Iraq’s political order after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Some also see the Kurds as an indispensable force in containing the Islamist ambitions of the Turkish government, which Israeli authorities have increasingly described as a “new Iran” after Assad’s fall, an event that brought Syria under the control of a Turkey-backed Islamist leadership.[ii] All of this aligns closely with America’s regional priorities and broader geopolitical calculations, which center on the security of Israel and competition with Russia and China. Together, these factors make the Kurds essential actors in shaping America’s relations with the four countries that have major Kurdish populations, namely Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and, by extension, its broader Middle East policy.

The growing significance of the Kurds is not the product of a single movement or a unified national project. It reflects instead how Kurdish actors have adapted to the collapse of old regimes and the uneven rise of new ones. In the process, Kurdish insurgencies, political experiments, and military alliances have become deeply entangled with the persistent ambitions and ambiguities of global and regional powers. From the Gulf War and the American invasion of Iraq to the fight against ISIS and the specter of regime change in Iran, every major challenge to the regional status quo has revealed the dynamism of Kurdish politics.

In Iraq, the Kurds have become the cornerstone of US strategy and of any viable settlement of the country’s political and territorial future, underscored by the recent opening of the largest US consulate in the world in Erbil, the capital of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In Syria, despite recent setbacks in their collaboration with the United States, the Kurds remain among the most vibrant actors in a war-torn country fractured along ethnic and sectarian lines. More importantly, the Rojava experience, the de facto autonomous administration led by the Kurds in northeastern Syria for more than a decade, has made the Kurds far more visible globally and contributed substantially to a growing sense of cross-border solidarity and patriotism among Kurds. Perhaps most consequentially, it has also generated increased sympathy toward the Kurds in the West, particularly in the United States and France, and in Israel, three influential states in Kurdish affairs, both among the public and within political circles.

In Iran, Kurdish mobilization has fused with nationwide demands for rights and representation, revealing how tightly Kurdish grievances now link domestic unrest to external pressure on the Islamic Republic. This was most evident in the nationwide protests triggered by the killing of Jina Mahsa Amini, a young Kurdish woman, by state forces in 2022, which rallied around the slogan ‘Women, Life, Freedom’ (Jin, Jiyan, Azadî), a phrase born in Kurdish resistance and carried onto the global stage by Kurdish women’s fight against ISIS in Syria. Home to the second-largest Kurdish population after Turkey and marked by a long history of political mobilization and intermittent experiences of autonomy, the Kurds in Iran are well-positioned to play a significant role in the country’s future.

Unlike Syria’s fragmented Kurdish regions along the Syrian–Turkish border, Iranian Kurdistan constitutes a contiguous territory along the Zagros Mountains, directly adjoining the autonomous Kurdish region of Iraq on the opposite side, which makes the prospect of cross-border Kurdish coordination and solidarity more feasible. This potential has been reinforced by the recent formation of the Alliance of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, which brings together five major armed Kurdish opposition parties in a unified political and military front, positioning themselves for a post-Islamic Republic order. In the event of regime collapse, the Kurds are therefore likely to press for political autonomy in Iran and to emerge as the most credible allies of a U.S. role in reshaping the country’s future.

Talk of a U.S.-coordinated Kurdish ground operation inside Iran is already circulating.[iii] If the Iranian regime continues to resist external pressure, Washington may eventually conclude that regime change cannot occur without boots on the ground. In such a scenario, Kurdish forces could become a central partner, not only as instruments of American strategy but also because U.S. interests may once again align, at least temporarily, with long-standing Kurdish aspirations. That, after all, is often how politics works, a lesson the Kurds have learned the hard way.

Kurdish actors are cautiously calculating the possible outcomes. They understand that Iran is not a peripheral actor but a formidable regional power. Any confrontation would carry enormous risks. For that reason, it seems unlikely that the West could secure Kurdish participation through military assistance alone. Recent developments in Syria, where shifting alliances and uncertain Western commitments have repeatedly exposed Kurdish forces to sudden strategic reversals, are likely to make Kurdish leaders demand stronger and clearer guarantees. Moreover, Iran is a far bigger strategic challenge than many assume, and persuading Kurdish forces to enter such a conflict would likely require substantial political and strategic commitments than the provision of arms.

The Kurdish Question Reshaping the Middle East

Though the Kurdish factor in Iran is likely to dominate the next chapter in the Kurdish question, the most significant shift may be unfolding in Ankara, where these different pieces of the puzzle are being cautiously knit together. Long the demographic, political, and strategic center of gravity of the Kurdish question, the Turkish state increasingly recognizes that the Kurds will neither fade from view nor remain a problem to be managed within its borders. Turkey stands apart from every other state confronting a Kurdish question: it hosts roughly half of all Kurds, nearly a quarter of its eighty-five million population, sits at the core of NATO, and retains a deep imperial memory of shaping regional orders. Unlike most Middle Eastern states, modern Turkey was never formally colonized by a European power, which continues to outline its political imagination. Drawing insights from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and from neighboring regimes that fractured under simultaneous internal and external pressure, Turkish leaders remain determined to prevent a divided or federalized Turkey from giving rise to a Kurdish polity on territory under their rule, a concern that has defined the republic’s national security priorities since its founding in 1923.

Despite its power, ambition, and experience, Turkey can no longer shape the Kurdish question unilaterally, compelling state elites to reimagine Turkish and Kurdish futures as intertwined rather than permanently opposed. Hence, likely with American encouragement, the Turkish state appears to be moving toward a framework that treats engagement with Kurdish actors, both within and beyond its borders, not as a concession but as a strategic recalibration. Regional geopolitics only heightens the stakes. In Iraq and Syria, the United States, alongside Israel, now exercises decisive influence over political and security outcomes. With the ongoing joint American-Israeli intervention in Iran, the two countries are also poised to shape the outcome of a post–Islamic Republic Iran should the current regime falter, an increasingly plausible scenario following the loss of a major ally in Syria with the toppling of Assad, Israeli and American strikes in the summer of 2025 that degraded Iran’s military command and nuclear program, and sustained unrest that has exposed deep economic and political vulnerabilities. Together, these developments have heightened Washington’s appetite for a more decisive push toward regime change. At the same time, Turkey, Iran’s historic rival and a state with deep ties to Iran’s large Azeri Turkish population, has begun strengthening these connections to counterbalance Kurdish influence and project its power into a potential post–Islamic Republic order.

American engagement across all these arenas is elevating Kurdish actors in ways Turkey can no longer block, forcing Ankara to adapt by containing rather than suppressing their growing influence. At the same time, Russia’s aggression around the Black Sea, first in the Caucasus and then in Eastern Europe, has underscored Ankara’s need to rebuild its regional standing and regain its role as NATO’s vital eastern partner, which makes it more receptive to American pressure and incentives to reorient its Kurdish policy in line with broader regional priorities. Against this backdrop, Turkey’s evolving posture toward the Kurds is less a gesture of goodwill than a response to a shifting balance of power. It reflects a growing recognition that the Kurds will be critical actors in the future of all three of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbors and, by extension, in Turkey’s own future.

If Ankara embraces this new vision, whereby the Kurds are potentially reimagined as allies rather than enemies, it could transform Turkey’s internal landscape and redefine its regional role. The silhouette of this shift is already visible in the quiet but consequential discussions surrounding the dissolution of the PKK. Perhaps ironically, this has become a live possibility not because Turkey overwhelms the PKK militarily, which it does, but because the Kurds are winning politically, thanks to decades of Kurdish activism, a regional balance that increasingly tilts in their favor, and sustained American involvement. Once treated as an obstacle to stability in the region, the Kurds now operate as the hinge between local dynamics, regional order, and global geopolitics. America’s inescapable Kurdish pivot in the “New” Middle East is the outcome of this complex intersectionality of Kurdish geopolitics.

...

Dr. Cevat Dargin is an Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern and North African History and Director of the International Studies Program at Norwich University, the oldest private military college in the United States and the birthplace of ROTC. He received his Ph.D. in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University and subsequently held a postdoctoral fellowship at the University of Michigan. Prior to joining Norwich, he served as a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Middle Eastern, South Asian, and African Studies at Columbia University. Dr. Dargin’s academic expertise lies in the history and contemporary implications of modern state formation in the Middle East and North Africa. He is currently working on a book manuscript tentatively titled Roads to Dersim: Kurds, Empire, Race, and the State.

[i] Karl Vick, “A New Middle East Is Unfolding Before Our Eyes.” TIME, June 22, 2025; Benjamin Netanyahu, “Address to the 78th Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 22, 2023; James L. Gelvin, The New Middle East: What Everyone Needs to Know, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2023); Abdellatif El-Menawy, “Between Illusions of the ‘Old’ and the ‘New’ Middle East,” Arab News, March 12, 2026; Marc Lynch, The Arab Uprisings: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012); Rami G. Khouri, “A New Middle East, or Rice’s Fantasy Ride?” YaleGlobal Online, July 31, 2006.

[ii] Mandy Turner, “Turkey Is Being Cast as ‘the Next Iran’. We Have Seen This Script Before.” The New Arab, March 11, 2026; Gülay Türkmen, Under the Banner of Islam: Turks, Kurds, and the Limits of Religious Unity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021; David L. Phillips, “Turkey Widening Its Rift with the U.S.” Axios, February 1, 2018; Cale Salih, “Turkey, the Kurds, and the Fight against Islamic State.” European Council on Foreign Relations, 14 September 2015.

[iii] Natasha Bertrand, Alayna Treene, Zachary Cohen, Clarissa Ward, and Vasco Cotovio, “CIA Working to Arm Kurdish Forces to Spark Uprising in Iran, Sources Say,” CNN, March 4, 2026.

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku, Associate Director of the Peace and War Center, yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris Associate Professor of Philosophy, dmorris3@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. James Deitch, Senior Research Fellow, Peace and War Center

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

On the fifteenth day of the U.S.-Israeli conflict against Iran, which started on February 28, 2026, missiles and bombs are hitting critical infrastructure, senior commanders have been killed, and the country has entered one of the most dangerous moments in its recent history. Yet the Islamic Republic still stands, not because it has achieved a conventional military victory or gained superiority on the battlefield, but because it follows a much simpler, more ideological principle: survival at any cost is victory.

This is the core political logic of the Islamic Republic in the current war, which cannot win in the traditional sense. Instead, it is trying to stay alive, preserve the regime’s coercive power, control the streets, and keep its flag flying. From the regime’s perspective, if it survives, it can claim victory, no matter how much destruction the country suffers.

This is not a new logic. Tehran has learned it from the wider axis of resistance, especially from Hamas in Gaza since October 7, 2023. Over the past two and a half years, Gaza has suffered devastating destruction. Entire neighborhoods have been destroyed. Hospitals, schools, roads, and public services have been reduced to rubble, and thousands of civilians have lost their lives. Yet Hamas survived as an organization, its armed members are still visible in the streets, and in the end, it presented survival itself as victory. As soon as the ceasefire was announced, Hamas members poured into the streets, beating Palestinians and executing “traitors,” those who dared to object to Hamas rule. For the Islamic Republic, Hamas’s main patron, that was the most important lesson: in an ideological war, military asymmetry does not automatically mean defeat. Like Hamas, if the ayatollah-led dictatorship remains in power and its security institutions, especially the IRGC, remain intact, it can frame the outcome as a success.

That is why the destruction of the country is neither decisive nor important to the regime. The loss of infrastructure, economic collapse, civilian suffering, and even the deaths of its own supporters do not outweigh the central priority of preserving the regime. In this worldview, the nation can be damaged, but the regime must endure. The regime does not exist to protect society. It expects society to absorb pain to protect the regime.

This approach also shapes the Islamic Republic’s military strategy. Having already lost much of its air force and seen its navy largely destroyed, Iran has turned to asymmetric attrition tactics. It uses the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic pressure point, deploys naval mines, targets commercial shipping, and attacks oil infrastructure in Arab countries to raise the global economic cost of the conflict. The regime’s main goal is to prolong the war, widen its economic consequences, and create pressure on global markets and Western public opinion.

This is a war strategy built not on battlefield superiority, but on endurance and escalation. The Islamic Republic wants to raise oil prices and spread international anxiety. Its hope is that political fatigue will eventually push Washington and Jerusalem to stop the war without pursuing regime change.

At home, the regime is applying the same principle with even greater urgency. Internal control is central to its war effort. It understands that if it loses control of the streets, it could lose everything. The regime could collapse very quickly if people pour into the streets, especially after the last wave of protests was brutally suppressed and 32,000 Iranians were massacred two months ago.

The regime is making this very clear. Protest in wartime is not treated as dissent, but as treason. From the Iranian police chief to IRGC commanders and state TV anchors, officials are threatening Iranians that if they come into the streets, there will be no mercy. State television consistently frames any anti-government mobilization as collaboration with the enemy.

That is why most Iranians have been forced to stay at home. On one side, they have been told by the United States, Israel, and even parts of the Iranian opposition to stay home because of restrictions and dangerous conditions. On the other side, they are afraid to go out because of the IRGC and Basij civil militia’s intimidation. Security forces drive through the streets with guns, patrol on motorcycles, and set up checkpoints across cities. Iranians are stopped, their cars are searched, and their phones are checked for anti-regime messages.

The regime is not only pushing Iranians out of public spaces in the streets. It is also marginalizing them online. Since the war started, the regime has imposed internet blackouts, cutting people off from the outside world. Phone service has been disrupted, and many people cannot contact family and friends inside Iran. We do not hear their voices.

At the same time, the regime provides its supporters with free, unlimited internet access to defend it online. Thousands of security forces have been mobilized to operate on social media, especially on X, criticizing the war’s opponents, defending the regime, and praising the newly appointed supreme leader.

Just as it dominates cyberspace, the regime also mobilizes its supporters in the streets. Every day, they move through neighborhoods with microphones, chanting in favor of the regime and intimidating ordinary Iranians. It uses every tool and every event to project an image of popularity. Funeral processions for killed commanders are turned into mass political theater, where pro-regime participants are presented as if they represent most Iranians mourning the martyrs. State television broadcasts images of crowds, flags, and chants to convey one message: Iranians stand with the regime, the nation is united, and resistance continues. This message is also directed at Western audiences, often helped by naïve journalists who have been allowed access to Iran.

Whether that image reflects social reality matters less than the regime’s ability to impose it. An authoritarian regime survives not only by force but also by controlling the media and shaping the narrative. The Islamic Republic needs to show that it still controls public space and, in one word, is still in charge. Even if military bases and missile sites are destroyed, and even if Iranian cities suffer blackouts and shortages, the regime’s claim to victory depends on proving that it has not lost control of either the streets or cyberspace.

For the Islamic Republic, then, the real battlefield is not only in the sky or at sea. It is also in the streets, in the media, and in the minds of both supporters and opponents. This is why survival has both military and political meanings. That is also why the regime is more focused on preserving the perception that it remains sovereign, feared, and unavoidable than on any other single objective.

This is especially important under the leadership of Mojtaba Khamenei. If he remains in power and the regime survives, it will present itself as having passed the test. The destruction of factories, ports, refineries, and civilian life will be treated as an acceptable price for the preservation of velayat-e faqih, the guardianship of the jurist. In the ideological logic of the Islamic Republic, the country may bleed, but the regime must live.

This is the essence of asymmetric war as Ayatollahs and their IRGC bodyguards understand it. Keep the coercive core intact, terrorize your people, and declare victory simply because you are still there. That is the model Hamas used in Gaza, and the Islamic Republic is now trying to apply it on a larger scale, with greater state capacity and broader regional tools.

History will eventually judge whether this idea of survival at any cost is truly a form of victory, or only the postponement of a larger defeat. But that is not how the Islamic Republic sees the matter.

Dr. Saeid Golkar is the UC Foundation Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. He specializes in the politics of authoritarian regimes, with a particular focus on Iran and the broader Middle East. He earned his PhD in Political Science from the University of Tehran and previously held research and teaching positions at Stanford University and Northwestern University. Golkar is the author of Captive Society: The Basij Militia and Social Control in Post-Revolutionary Iran (Columbia University Press, 2015), which received the Washington Institute’s Silver Medal Prize. His forthcoming book, Dictators and the Higher Education Dilemma, will be published by Rutgers University Press in spring 2026

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku, Associate Director of the Peace and War Center, yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris Associate Professor of Philosophy, dmorris3@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. James Deitch, Senior Research Fellow, Peace and War Center

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

Moldova’s remarkable progress toward European integration will remain dangerously reversible unless the United States and the European Union adopt an immediate, unified strategy to secure its economy, fortify its democracy, and modernize its defense — because Russia has already positioned Moldova as the next front in its campaign against Ukraine.[1] The warning signs are not subtle. They are structural, historical, and increasingly operational. Moldova sits at the intersection of every pressure point Russia has exploited over the past decade: frozen conflicts, energy coercion, hybrid warfare, demographic vulnerability, and institutional fragility.[2] What distinguishes Moldova today is not its weakness but its momentum — and that is precisely what Moscow seeks to arrest.[3]

Moldova’s Democratic Transformation Under Pressure

For the first time since independence, Moldova has a government that is not merely pro-European in rhetoric but in action.[4] Under President Maia Sandu, the country has secured EU candidate status, opened accession negotiations, reformed its electoral code, strengthened the Central Election Commission, and passed a constitutional amendment enshrining EU membership as a national objective.[5] These are not symbolic gestures. They are the foundations of a democratic transformation that is already reshaping Moldova’s political culture and administrative capacity. Yet they remain embryonic, vulnerable to both internal polarization and external sabotage. The narrow margins of Sandu’s 2024 victory, the persistent influence of pro-Russian parties, and the Kremlin’s escalating disinformation campaigns all underscore how fragile this progress remains.[6]

Russia understands this fragility well. Its illegal troop presence in Transnistria — a Soviet-era relic Moscow refuses to relinquish — remains a direct challenge to Moldova’s sovereignty and a ready-made lever for destabilization. The war in Ukraine has only heightened the danger. Moscow’s attempts to seize a land bridge along Ukraine’s southern coast were not merely tactical; they were designed to place Russian forces within striking distance of Moldova’s eastern border. Even today, the Kremlin uses Transnistria’s energy infrastructure to pressure Chișinău, exploiting Moldova’s dependence on electricity generated in the breakaway region. Hybrid attacks, cyber intrusions, political manipulation, and the financing of extremist groups have intensified, mirroring the playbook Russia used in Ukraine before 2014 and again in 2022.[7]

A Strengthening Western Coalition

Yet Moldova is not standing still. Nor is it alone. The United States has quietly become one of its most consequential partners. Washington’s investments in Moldova’s energy independence — from supporting the Strășeni–Gutinaș power line to enabling Moldova’s first LNG imports from the United States — have reduced the country’s reliance on Russian gas for the first time in its modern history. The $15 million project to build a secure emergency communications network, along with the modernization of forensic and border control capacities, reflects a deeper recognition that Moldova’s internal resilience is a matter of regional security. These are not charity projects. They are strategic investments that blunt Russia’s ability to coerce a vulnerable state on NATO’s frontier.[8]

Europe, too, is awakening to Moldova’s importance. Romania has emerged as Chișinău’s most committed partner, not only politically but also administratively. The transfer of Romanian expertise in EU fund absorption — a chronic bottleneck for Moldova — is accelerating the country’s ability to implement European standards and modernize its infrastructure. Strategic twinning between Romanian and Moldovan municipalities is no longer symbolic; it is producing replicable models for healthcare modernization, digital governance, and transparent project management. President Nicușor Dan’s insistence that Moldova’s sovereignty and democratic will must guide the bilateral relationship reflects a mature partnership grounded in respect rather than paternalism.[9]

The Baltic states have also stepped forward, recognizing in Moldova the same vulnerabilities they once faced. The upcoming visit of the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian parliamentary speakers to Chișinău is more than diplomatic choreography. It signals a shared understanding that Moldova’s success is integral to the security of Europe’s northeastern flank. These states — hardened by their own histories with Moscow — view Moldova not as a peripheral concern but as a frontline state whose fate will shape the continent’s trajectory.[10]

Perhaps most consequential, Poland has emerged as Moldova’s strategic bridge to Washington. With its strong economy, formidable military, and unique access to U.S. policymakers, Warsaw is well positioned to elevate Moldova’s security concerns — especially the withdrawal of Russian troops from Transnistria — onto the broader Euro-Atlantic agenda. The new Polish-Moldovan defense partnership, focused on modernizing Moldova’s military education, training, and resilience, is a critical step toward building a defense sector capable of deterring hybrid threats and supporting Moldova’s democratic reforms. President Sandu’s recent visit to Warsaw, followed by her leadership role at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, underscores Moldova’s growing diplomatic stature at a moment when the region is seeking stability.[11]

What the West Must Do Now

But momentum alone is not a strategy. Moldova’s vulnerabilities remain acute. Severe winter storms that recently paralyzed Chișinău exposed the fragility of local governance and the political friction that can impede crisis response. Chronic emigration continues to hollow out the workforce. Administrative capacity gaps slow the absorption of EU funds. The Trump administration’s abrupt shift toward transactional foreign policy has injected uncertainty into U.S. assistance programs, particularly those administered through USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Moldova cannot afford to have its future hinge on the volatility of Washington’s internal politics.[12]

This is why the United States and the European Union must act now, not reactively or incrementally, but strategically. Moldova needs a multidomain integration plan that accelerates its economic development, strengthens its democratic institutions, and modernizes its defense sector. It needs a Western strategy that treats Moldova not as a peripheral project but as a central pillar of Europe’s security architecture. It needs sustained engagement from Congress, civil society, and expert communities in Washington and Brussels to ensure that support does not evaporate with each electoral cycle.[13]

The alternative is clear. If the West hesitates, Russia will not. Moldova is the last unanchored democracy between the EU and a revanchist Russia. It is the most exposed state on Ukraine’s western flank. It is also the only place where Moscow still believes it can reverse the tide of European integration. The question is not whether Moldova matters. It is whether the United States and Europe will act quickly enough to protect a country that has chosen the West and is now risking everything for it.[14]

If Moldova falls, it will not fall alone. It will take with it the credibility of Europe’s enlargement policy, the stability of NATO’s eastern flank, and the hope for democratic transformation across the post-Soviet space. But if Moldova succeeds — if the West helps it succeed — it will mark the first time in a generation that a small, vulnerable state on Russia’s border has chosen democracy and won.[15]

That is a victory worth securing now, before the next front opens.

Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. During his Marine Corps career, he deployed to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. His published works can be found in USNI’s Proceedings, Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, and the Journal of the American Revolution.

[1] Stimson Center, “Memo: Moldova’s Strategic Vulnerabilities and Western Policy Options,” 2025.

[2] CIA World Factbook, “Moldova,” 2025.

[3] Radio Moldova, “Sandu Secures Polish Support to Negotiate Withdrawal of Illicit Russian Troops,” January 27, 2026.

[4] TRM, “President Nicușor Dan Backs Moldova’s EU Ambitions Amid Reunification Debates,” January 23, 2026.

[5] Radio Moldova, “PACE Winter Session: President Maia Sandu to Outline European Security Priorities,” January 23, 2026.

[6] Stimson Center, “Memo: Moldova’s Strategic Vulnerabilities and Western Policy Options,” 2025.

[7] Stimson Center, “Memo.”

[8] Stimson Center, “Memo.”

[9] TRM, “President Nicușor Dan Backs Moldova’s EU Ambitions Amid Reunification Debates,” January 23, 2026.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Radio Moldova, “PACE Winter Session: President Maia Sandu to Outline European Security Priorities,” January 23, 2026.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Stimson, “Memo”

[14] Radio Moldova, “PACE Winter Session: President Maia Sandu to Outline European Security Priorities,” January 23, 2026.

[15] Radio Moldova, “PACE Winter Session: President Maia Sandu to Outline European Security Priorities,” January 23, 2026.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku (Associate Professor of Political Science; Associate Director of the Peace and War Center): yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris (Associate Professor of Philosophy): dmorris3@norwich.edu

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

Four years of relentless, uncompromising Russo-Ukrainian combat convey a single clear message – the war is far from over.

A War Longer Than Expected

By early January 2026, Russia’s war against Ukraine has crossed a notable historical threshold: a stark but historic confrontation has now lasted longer than the Soviet Union’s Great Patriotic War, which ran from the launch of Nazi Germany’s Operation Barbarossa on Sunday, 22 June 1941, to Germany’s capitulation on Saturday, 9 May 1945. This comparison is striking not only for its historical symbolism, but also because many observers around the world initially expected the invasion of Ukraine to conclude within days rather than stretch into years.

Four years of war have once again challenged the assumption that large states are unlikely to lose wars against smaller adversaries. Historical experience repeatedly suggests otherwise. Relevant examples include Russia’s defeat in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, the outcome of the First Russo-Chechen War of 1994-1996, the United States’ protracted and ultimately unsuccessful military campaign in Vietnam, as well as the inconclusive and costly Soviet and later American interventions in Afghanistan.

Neither Victory Nor Defeat

The approaching anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and multiple unsuccessful mediation efforts by international actors aimed at achieving a negotiated settlement in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict provide an occasion for renewed attempts to assess the future trajectory of this war. It can now be stated with reasonable confidence that Russia is not winning and Ukraine is not losing.
Moscow is not achieving victory, as it has failed to accomplish its primary strategic objectives, namely the occupation of Ukraine’s critical political and economic centers and regime change in Kyiv.

At the same time, it is equally valid to conclude that despite enormous pressure, heavy casualties, and extensive destruction, Kyiv is not defeated. Ukraine has managed to preserve its statehood, retain control over key political and economic hubs, sustain the operational functioning of its armed forces and governing institutions, and prevent a decisive strategic shift in favor of the adversary. In practical terms, the conflict has evolved into a protracted war of attrition in which neither side currently possesses the capacity to secure a decisive advantage. Nevertheless, Ukraine’s continued resistance and its ability to maintain national governance already represent a disruption of Russia’s initial strategic assumptions.
Ukrainians increasingly recognize that, however harsh and exhausting the situation may be, it is strategically more advantageous, and arguably necessary, to continue fighting through sheer endurance. The rationale for this position follows below.

The Limits of Negotiation

Any illusions about a potential “freezing” of the war should be abandoned. A freeze in the conflict would be theoretically possible only if Trump reached an agreement with Putin. Both leaders have, at various times, demonstrated a degree of indifference toward the rules-based international order, and Trump’s National Security Strategy notably did not frame Russia primarily as a threat, instead emphasizing the pursuit of strategic stability in U.S.-Russia relations. Over the past year, many European leaders appeared to hope, largely in vain, that Trump might reassess his position, recognize Russia as the aggressor in Ukraine, and acknowledge Ukraine’s right to defend itself following Russia’s invasion. These expectations were repeatedly disappointed, as Trump tended to discount European arguments. However, following the Joint Statement of 14 February by the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Germany, and the Netherlands concerning the death of Alexei Navalny, the diplomatic environment changed materially. The coordinated European position, which publicly attributed responsibility to the Russian authorities, substantially narrowed the political space for engagement. In this context, even Trump may be more reluctant to pursue compromise with Putin, given the heightened political sensitivity surrounding direct negotiations. The findings from five independent European biological laboratories cannot realistically be ignored, and entering any form of agreement with a figure widely perceived as toxic and criminal in every respect has become politically and strategically untenable.

Security Guarantees and Political Signaling

Over the past six months, Zelensky has repeatedly emphasized the need for “security guarantees.” This is not merely political bargaining or presidential stubbornness. Without such guarantees, any peace arrangement with Putin effectively opens the door to Ukraine’s strategic defeat. It is widely assumed that Putin has no intention of providing meaningful guarantees. Against mounting economic pressure and declining export revenues, his likely objective would be to preserve military capability for future offensive operations while redirecting state finances toward domestic stabilization at a difficult moment for his regime. The question then becomes what specific pressures are affecting Putin and his armed forces.

Erosion of Russian Combat Motivation

Frontline reporting indicates a sharp increase in desertion rates and avoidance of assault assignments. Within combat units, this is directly linked to unprecedented delays in financial compensation and the effective rollback of assault-related pay incentives, which have quickly eroded troop motivation. In what is increasingly characterized as a quasi-contractor Russian force, personnel are actively seeking grounds to avoid frontline engagement, maneuvering for transfers to second-line roles or delaying deployment to zero-line positions. Field commanders are aware that promised payments are not arriving, while documentation confirming participation in assault operations frequently “disappears” at the staff level. As a result, the risk of receiving no compensation for injuries or active combat deployments has become a decisive factor for many contract fighters. Resentment is growing as personnel perceive that the state is economizing precisely on those sustaining the heaviest casualties. This significantly undermines trust in command structures. After four years of war, and after becoming accustomed to large financial incentives, many contract fighters expect continued compensation. Coercing them into high-risk operations without substantial pay is becoming increasingly unrealistic.

Domestic Manpower Constraints

At the same time, Russia now faces a severe nationwide manpower shortage across multiple sectors, including law enforcement, firefighting services, industrial labor, and healthcare. The government’s heavy financial incentives for military service have drained civilian labor pools. Emergency services are reportedly considering recruiting conscripts into firefighting roles, while police and the penal system openly acknowledge staffing crises due to so many personnel being deployed to the front. If financial incentives for frontline service are simultaneously reduced, the result is a structurally self-reinforcing personnel deficit.

The Economic Burden of Attrition

The war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine has a profound economic dimension. Given heavy battlefield losses and escalating recruitment costs for new contract soldiers, maintaining a manpower advantage now requires enormous expenditure. For a projected active offensive phase in spring 2026, personnel costs alone, particularly assault-oriented contract forces, could exceed five trillion rubles (approximately 65,153,450,000 USD). This excludes equipment, logistics, communications, and medical support. At the overall budgetary scale, such spending approaches the magnitude of Russia’s projected federal budget deficit for 2025. Putin is almost certainly aware that this amounts to a high-stakes financial gamble.

Operational Stagnation

The long-held assumption that Russia possesses an effectively unlimited mobilization pool is proving inaccurate even in a country of 140 million people. Persistent, highly resilient Ukrainian resistance is producing tangible effects. Over the last two extremely difficult years, Russian losses have roughly matched the annual recruitment of contract personnel, approximately 420,000 per year. Since 2024, Russia has sustained heavy casualties while achieving only limited territorial gains, failing to accumulate sufficient combat power for decisive breakthroughs, particularly in conditions where large-scale enemy drone deployment complicates or prevents effective concentration of forces.

Attempts during preparations for the 2025 spring-summer offensive to build a strategic reserve of new recruits largely failed because frontline losses forced commanders to commit reserves merely to sustain ongoing operations. The autumn 2025 offensive similarly lacked sufficient reserves for a breakthrough and yielded unimpressive results. Following the completion of the Kursk operation, Russia failed to achieve a major breakthrough inside Ukraine. Overall advances have slowed to a crawl. Operationally, the front has largely stagnated.

The Strategic Stakes of Donbas

I am not suggesting that Russia lacks the capacity to regain the initiative on the battlefield; however, throughout the war, Russian forces have demonstrated difficulty generating decisive superiority along specific axes without urgently redeploying units from other sectors. Assault brigades have repeatedly been shifted from Zaporizhzhia to the Kursk region, then toward Druzhkivka, and subsequently to the Kupiansk axis, where an entire composite assault grouping suffered severe losses. Political reporting to Moscow about having “taken Kupiansk on credit” compelled continued offensive operations despite insufficient strength, yet Ukrainian defenses held.

This continuous operational reshuffling suggests that a large-scale summer 2026 offensive toward Zaporizhzhia appears unlikely. This context frames the strategic stakes around potential concessions in northern Donbas, concessions reportedly sought by both Putin and Trump. Ukraine cannot afford such concessions because they would allow Putin to declare victory domestically while leaving Ukraine exposed to renewed aggression. Understanding this logic clarifies the broader strategic picture.

Ukraine’s Defensive Logic

Recently, in an interview with Axios, Volodymyr Zelensky stated that “the people of Ukraine will not accept a peace agreement that requires the withdrawal of Ukrainian armed forces from Donbas and the transfer of that region to Russia.” He also added emotionally that “people will never forgive” him and “will not forgive the United States.”

The emotional tone of such interviews can be interpreted in different ways; however, statements of this kind usually reflect a fairly transparent pragmatic calculation. They serve as a signal to both domestic audiences and external partners that significant underlying considerations and constraints exist behind the public rhetoric.

Over the past two years, Ukraine’s primary objective has been sustained defensive resilience combined with systematic attrition of Russian manpower. Ukrainian forces have maintained defensive lines while minimizing civilian losses and constructing what could be described as a “fortress belt,” heavily fortified defensive zones, particularly within the Kramatorsk agglomeration (Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk). This currently represents the most fortified region in the country. Any Russian attempt to seize these areas in a future offensive would likely entail 18 to 24 months of intensive combat and losses potentially comparable to the entirety of the current approximately 600,000-strong Russian grouping, necessitating the formation of yet another force group. Ceding Donbas would effectively hand Russia this prepared fortified asset without a fight, something Ukrainian planners consider strategically unacceptable.

Constraints on Russian Force Expansion

If Putin were to secure control of northern Donbas without combat, particularly with Trump’s political backing, it would constitute a major strategic victory. He would remove a significant military obstacle, preserve a large combat-capable force for future operations, and free substantial financial resources to stabilize his regime amid deteriorating economic conditions. Should all negotiations collapse entirely, renewed large-scale combat in 2026 would present severe challenges for both sides. Ukraine faces manpower shortages, desertion issues, and damaged energy infrastructure. Russia would simultaneously confront tightening economic constraints and escalating personnel losses while attempting to breach Ukraine’s fortified defensive belt.

In 2023, the Russian Ministry of Defense effectively succeeded in generating a new combined-arms field army alongside several corps- and division-level formations. Despite sustained high personnel losses, this expansion contributed to limited tactical gains and partial operational stabilization in several sectors of the front. Russia’s financial contract-recruitment model continues, at present, to meet baseline manpower requirements. Current efforts appear focused on enlarging existing brigade formations and progressively reconstituting them into divisions, drawing primarily on personnel from reserve regiments established across Russian regions in late 2022 and early 2023. Should this recruitment system experience disruption, particularly through suspension or prolonged delays in financial compensation, and should battlefield conditions deteriorate further, compulsory mobilization would likely become the primary remaining mechanism for force regeneration. At present, however, there are no definitive indicators of systemic breakdown within Russia’s contract recruitment pipeline.

At the same time, available indicators suggest a gradual contraction in the pool of personnel willing to deploy, primarily due to financial incentives. Frontline service members increasingly express concerns regarding the qualitative composition of incoming manpower replacements. Recruitment patterns indicate disproportionate reliance on socio-economically vulnerable populations, including unemployed individuals, persons with prior criminal records, and, in some cases, personnel recruited directly from penal institutions. This tends to correlate with lower baseline motivation, limited technical proficiency, and reduced adaptability under contemporary combat conditions. The evolving character of modern warfare increasingly prioritizes technically skilled personnel capable of operating digital systems, advanced weapons platforms, ISR-linked assets, and modern communications infrastructure, rather than large volumes of minimally trained infantry.

Russia’s ability to significantly expand force structure or accelerate recruitment tempo appears structurally constrained. Even a renewed large-scale mobilization would not automatically translate into increased combat effectiveness, since modern warfare depends on cohesive, fully equipped formations rather than individual personnel alone. Formation generation requires not only manpower, but also equipment availability, functioning command-and-control (C2) architecture, sustainment capacity, and a sufficiently trained officer corps. Equipment stocks remain finite, while the rapid generation of qualified officers represents a persistent structural bottleneck.

Toward a Prolonged Strategic Stalemate

Collectively, these factors constrain Russia’s capacity to rapidly scale effective combat power despite ongoing manpower mobilization efforts. The war has settled into a prolonged strategic stalemate in which endurance, resource mobilization, and political cohesion may prove more decisive than battlefield maneuver alone. This reality should shape expectations about both the duration of the conflict and its wider geopolitical consequences.

Dmitry Beliakov is a Russian photojournalist born in 1970 in the Vologda region of northwestern Russia. Over the course of his career, he has covered seven armed conflicts, including the Chechen wars, the war in Syria, and the war in eastern Ukraine. His work has received numerous international awards, including the Overseas Press Club of America Award. His photography has appeared in major international publications such as The Sunday Times Magazine, Paris Match, and The Wall Street Journal, among others. He was featured in the CBS News and Showtime Films documentary Three Days in September (2006), about the Beslan school hostage tragedy.

Beliakov’s work has been exhibited internationally, including in Russia, the United States, Armenia, France, Italy, and the United Arab Emirates. In February 2023, he presented his exhibition On the Margins of Europe: A War Before the War, featuring his work from the Donbas conflict, at the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace and War Center at Norwich University.

After publicly opposing Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Beliakov relocated to the United States with his family, with support from the Andrei Sakharov Foundation. He subsequently received a fellowship at Norwich University in Vermont. He currently lives in Vermont, where he teaches conflict reporting, works as a commercial photographer, and continues his documentary practice across New England.

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku, Associate Director of the Peace and War Center, yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris Associate Professor of Philosophy, dmorris3@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. James Deitch, Senior Research Fellow, Peace and War Center

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

The rights and responsibilities of the citizenry

In 1789, Thomas Jefferson was serving as the U.S. Minister to France on the eve of the French Revolution. In a letter to his friend Richard Price, he wrote, “…wherever the people are well informed they can be trusted with their own government; that whenever things get so far wrong as to attract their notice, they may be relied on to set them to rights.”i While that particular quote was in a private letter that would not become well-known for many years, it succinctly describes an idea that permeated the nation from its founding.

A year earlier, our Founding Fathers were acting on what Jefferson eventually articulated. James Monroe, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay wrote a series of essays known as The Federalist Papersii under the pseudonym Publius to present their argument to voters in support of the Constitution. Several anti-federalists, like ‘Brutus’ (believed to be Robert Yates) and Patrick Henry, engaged in the public debate with the Anti-Federalist Papers.iii These essays and speeches provided enough information to the citizenry to play a crucial role in the formation of the United States of America. In the end, the Constitution was ratified, and a Bill of Rights was added, addressing many of the anti-federalists’ concerns.

It seems evident that a well-informed citizenry was considered essential to retaining the rights so hard-won during the Revolutionary War. The very public debate in the Federalist and Anti-Federalist Papers was a concerted effort by political activists to ensure that the citizenry was well informed in 1788.

Too little or too much information

Let’s consider information on a linear scale:

The danger of too little information is evident in the context of a voting citizenry. To elect effective representation, the people need at least enough information to assess a candidate’s stance on the topics that most affect them. On the linear scale above, having too little information or being uninformed prevents individuals from being trusted agents in any type of democracy. At the opposite end of the scale, too much information is also a danger. Assuming the above scale is only addressing information consumed by the general population (not those in positions where information is required for success or advantage), too much information can cause harm in a practical sense such as in the case of Operational Security in military operations, but also philosophically can lead to a sort of Gnosiophobiaiv, or fear of knowing, fear of being obligated to act or hopelessness because of an inability to act. So, in the linear sense, too little information is uninformed, enough information is informed, and too much information is over-informed.

Too little AND too much information

But that doesn’t answer the question of what makes a citizenry well-informed. I argue it is not as linear as it seems. While too little or too much information is problematic, too little AND too much could be just as detrimental to public involvement in policy creation. You become informed, but perhaps not well-informed.

And this is because the information consumed has two y-axis components for a well-informed citizen: volume and variety.

Having both too much and too little information, in other words, volume without variety, prevents critical thinking and causes our brains to revert to heuristics (mental shortcuts we use to speed up problem solving). There is more information available than most individuals can consume. To make sense of it all, our brains tend to choose the path of least resistance, meaning the information that most agrees with our current thinking is the most readily consumed, which then leads to a lack of variety…too much AND too little. If we could formulate it as a mathematical equation in which the amount of information consumed has a limit, the increase in volume would be equal to the decrease in variety.

Part of the issue is that our sources of information have increased a thousand-fold, which allows us to engage in confirmation bias by only absorbing sources that feed into our own bias, not for any nefarious reasons, but simply because the volume is more than we have the time or capacity to consume. Therefore, we choose the information that best reflects our own views. In neurological circles, this is referred to as motivated attentionv, which suggests that our brains have adapted to the volume of information available by subconsciously focusing on opportunities and threats, as these are the pieces of information most important to our well-being. This shortcut that our brains have developed makes it difficult to focus on reasonable (not a threat) but opposing (not an opportunity) viewpoints without a concerted effort on the part of the individual.

The amount of information we can process has increased by approximately 5% per year, according to some studies, based on human ability to adapt.vi However, the amount of information available increases exponentially due to the phenomenon of accelerating returns, or Moore’s Law, which conjectures that the processing speed of technology doubles every two years, based on the number of transistors that can be placed in an integrated circuit.vii With a variety of U.S. news outlets and access to global news and social media, there is nearly unlimited information. Since it doesn’t have to be accurate or relevant in the social media realm, the amount of information available is limited only by the human imagination and how quickly the internet can pull it up. However, the amount of information that an individual can effectively process is limited. Thus, every individual ends their day having absorbed volumes of information, but perhaps not a diverse enough variety to be considered well-informed, as envisioned by our Founding Fathers. Some of this is self-imposed, since we can certainly tune into a different news station or follow other people on our social media feeds. Some of it, however, is unavoidable because of how our brains handle the volume of information we receive.

Individual responsibility as a necessary part of our democracy

This leads back to the quote from Jefferson. We are entrusted to ‘set things right’ by voting for government representatives who will enact our will, but we can only do that by being well-informed.

In 1788, the volume of information was limited to a dozen or so pundits on two fairly distinct sides of a singular fence. The information space today is far murkier. On the surface, it may still seem as if there are two distinct sides. However, by incorporating far-left and far-right ideologies on both sides, along with additional noise from global sources, the bifurcated nature of politics becomes less clear. And rather than a few articulate political advocates shaping the arguments on our many-sided fence, as was the case in 1788, anyone with a social media account (articulate or not) contributes to both the volume and variety of information available.

Fortunately, we live in a country where every citizen not only has the right but is charged with the responsibility of self-governance by the founders of our nation. And they gave us the means to do so through an elected representative government. However, it is an individual responsibility to be well-informed so as to be a citizen who can be trusted with their own government.

Being well-informed means consuming information in equal measures of volume and variety. That takes work. No one can do that part for us.

The United States version of democracy is supposed to be a little messy. It was always meant to engender debate and tension. And it was always meant to have a well-informed citizenry available to hold it accountable. However, in today’s information space, individual citizens face a challenging task. The sheer volume of both information and misinformation makes being well-informed difficult and often exhausting.

However, it will always be worth the effort.

Retired Brigadier General Tracey Poirier most recently served as the Director of the Joint Staff for the Vermont National Guard until her retirement from service in October 2025. She graduated from Norwich University in 1996 with a bachelor’s degree in English and communications and is the only Norwich graduate to be selected as a Rhodes Scholar. After earning two master’s degrees from Oxford University in England, one in anthropology and one in human resource management, she went on to serve on active duty with the Marine Corps until 2004. In 2006, she re-entered military service with the Vermont National Guard, eventually becoming the first woman to be promoted to a flag officer rank in the Vermont Army National Guard. Additionally, she served as an administrator for Norwich University, culminating as the Assistant Vice President for Student Affairs, and continues to serve as an adjunct professor of anthropology.

i https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-14-02-0196 ii Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Rossiter, C., Jay, J., & Kesler, C. R. (2005). The federalist papers. Signet Classics, an imprint of New American Library, a division of Penguin Group (USA). iii Ketcham, R. (2003). The Anti-Federalist papers ; and, the constitutional convention debates. Signet Classic. iv Maslow, A. H. (1963). The Need to know and the Fear of Knowing. The Journal of General Psychology, 68(1), 111–125. https://doi.org/10.1080/00221309.1963.9920516 v Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., and Cuthbert, B. N. 1997. Motivated attention: affect, activation, and action. In: Lang, P. J., Simons, R. F., and Balaban, M. T., editors. Attention and Orienting: Sensory and Motivational Processes. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. p. 97–135. vi Bohn, R., and Short, J. 2012. Measuring consumer information. Int. J. Comm. 6:980–1000. vii Intel Newsroom Press Kit: Moore’s Law, Sep 2023, https://newsroom.intel.com/press-kit/moores-law#:~:text=Moore’s%20Law%20is%20the%20observation,must%20innovate%20in%20other%20ways

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku (Associate Professor of Political Science; Associate Director of the Peace and War Center): yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris (Associate Professor of Philosophy): dmorris3@norwich.edu

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

The most consequential transformation in U.S.–Latin American relations today is not rhetorical, ideological, or even overtly partisan. It is operational. What can be described as the Trump Corollary marks a decisive shift in how the United States exercises power in the Western Hemisphere: away from direct responsibility for political outcomes and toward the outsourcing of coercion, enforcement, and political risk to compliant regional partners. This approach does not constitute disengagement. It represents a colder, more transactional mode of governance that prioritizes short-term control over long-term stability, and security outcomes over democratic institutions.

The 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) makes the logic explicit. Washington now defines a “reasonably stable and well-governed” hemisphere primarily as one that prevents and discourages mass migration and cooperates against cartels and “narco-terrorists,” while denying extra-hemispheric competitors’ control over “strategically vital assets.”[1] The center of gravity is not democratic governance; it is controllability.

From primacy to perimeter management

In earlier eras, U.S. hemispheric policy swung between crusading language and pragmatic deals. What is unique now is how openly the NSS promotes “enlist and expand” as a delegation strategy: recruit regional allies to “create tolerable stability” and grow partnerships, even with governments “with different outlooks,” when interests align.^[2] This isn’t a return to Cold War-style anticommunism but rather a move toward transactional governance-by-proxy.

That shift is already evident in Washington’s view of the border. The NSS’s claim that “the era of mass migration is over” is presented as a matter of sovereignty and national security, with border control emphasized as “the primary element of national security.”^[3] When migration is seen as an existential threat, exceptional measures become standard tools. In practice, the “Trump Corollary” becomes a license to move the most difficult, legally complex parts of migration control offshore.

The same lens is applied to markets and infrastructure. The NSS links hemispheric dominance to commercial diplomacy and the prevention of “hostile foreign incursion or ownership of key assets,” explicitly connecting security to ports, sea lanes, and strategic locations. This is important in countries where logistics hubs, telecom networks, and mineral supply chains are politically contested. The Corollary’s economic promise is speed: urging nearshoring and “reciprocal” deals, supported by tariffs and conditionalities.^[4] Its economic risk is fragility: governments will hedge when they perceive U.S. demands as coercive rather than cooperative, and rivals will exploit the resulting resentment.

Outsourcing coercion as policy, not aberration

Outsourcing coercion isn’t just about capacity; it’s about jurisdiction. Externalized detention and transfers to third countries create a cloud of legal ambiguity: the United States maintains influence and leverage, while partner governments provide territory, custody, and plausible deniability. The aim is to strengthen the perimeter without incurring the full domestic political and legal costs of doing the same things within U.S. borders.

This is why the migration architecture matters beyond migration. When a great power normalizes delegated coercion, it exports incentives. It rewards leaders who can deliver “results” quickly—measured in removals, detentions, and visible toughness—while weakening the reputational and diplomatic penalties that previously constrained illiberal practices. The result is a regional market for coercive services.

The Trump–Bukele security bargain

The clearest expression of the Corollary’s operating logic is the alignment with President Nayib Bukele. The United States agreed to pay El Salvador to detain hundreds of migrants deported from the United States—many allegedly tied to criminal organizations—inside the country’s high-security prison system.[5] The underlying message is not subtle: detention is now a tradable instrument of bilateral cooperation.

Human Rights Watch has argued that U.S. transfers and Salvadoran custody have produced conditions consistent with enforced disappearance, detainees held incommunicado, with families unable to confirm location or status, and with neither government providing transparent, reviewable processes.[6] Subsequent documentation by Human Rights Watch and Cristosal alleges torture and other severe abuses against Venezuelan deportees held in El Salvador’s detention system, including the Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT).[7] Amnesty International has similarly warned that expulsions to El Salvador amid the ongoing state of exception expose people to grave abuses and undermine due process guarantees.[8] Even if one accepts the premise that criminal networks exploit migration flows, policy choices remain subject to legal and normative constraints. The Corollary’s wager is that those constraints can be managed through distance.

This is where the bargain becomes a strategic trap. By making Bukele’s carceral state an instrument of U.S. policy, Washington strengthens the very governance model that has hollowed out judicial independence and normalized emergency rule in El Salvador. It also supplies other leaders in the region a new playbook: promise “order” and deliver cooperation to Washington, and the democratic costs become secondary.

The legal architecture reinforces the pattern. A detailed legal analysis of U.S.–El Salvador “diplomatic notes” argues that the arrangement functions as a “fig leaf”: non-binding assurances that do little to mitigate the risk of torture while simultaneously implying continuing U.S. influence over detainee disposition.[9] That is the essence of outsourced coercion, control without responsibility.[10]

The diffusion problem: when “success” travels

If you want to see how the Corollary remakes power, watch how quickly coercive governance becomes exportable. Once a model is treated as “effective,” it spreads through imitation and selective learning. In the short term, this diffusion can manifest as policy convergence on public safety. In reality, it often means convergence around institutional shortcuts: emergency decrees, militarized policing, expanded detention, and weakened oversight.

That diffusion has predictable second-order effects. It pressures civilian control of security forces by elevating coercive capacity as the key currency of international relevance. It expands the political role of prison and police institutions. And it makes the line between domestic governance and international bargaining porous: a leader’s ability to deliver repression at home becomes an asset in negotiations with Washington.

Venezuela and the managed-authoritarianism temptation

Venezuela is the Corollary’s other test case because it exposes the strategic contradiction at the heart of U.S. power. Washington wants decisive outcomes—reduced migration, weakened transnational crime, diminished extra-hemispheric influence—but it also wants to avoid prolonged responsibility. In a War on the Rocks analysis, the “day after” problem is framed bluntly: decapitation is not the hard part; stabilization and governance are.[11] Any serious regime-change scenario produces a Pottery Barn dilemma—break it, own it—even if the United States tries to keep boots on the ground and responsibilities outsourced.

The more recent corollary is darker. If the United States prioritizes short-term controllability over long-term democratic reconstruction, it can end up tolerating, even facilitating, a post-regime order that is “managed” rather than democratized—an authoritarian equilibrium that is cleaner, more predictable, and externally aligned.[12] That outcome can reduce immediate volatility and migration pressure while entrenching coercive institutions and narrowing the space for genuine pluralism.

This is not theoretical. Authoritarian systems often survive leadership loss through “coup-proofing”: overlapping coercive agencies, patronage networks, and incentives that make defection costly. Research shows that transitions following dictator removal frequently stall or invert when coercive institutions remain intact and unaccountable.[13] In Venezuela, the risk is that a transition becomes a security project led by those best positioned to control violence rather than those best positioned to rebuild legitimate authority.[14]

What this does to U.S. power

The Corollary’s promise is clarity: reduce migration, constrain rivals, and reassert hemispheric primacy. The price is that U.S. influence becomes increasingly dependent on illiberal partners, and U.S. legitimacy becomes contingent on the very abuses Washington once claimed to oppose. That is not just a moral problem; it is a strategic problem.

First, outsourced coercion creates blowback risk. Abuses in partner prisons do not stay “over there.” They create litigation, congressional scrutiny, reputational damage, and, over time, distrust among publics whose cooperation the United States needs for everything from intelligence sharing to port access. Second, it narrows diplomatic bandwidth. When migration control is the organizing principle, Washington’s leverage becomes hostage to a small set of strongmen who can credibly threaten non-cooperation.

Third, the Corollary reshapes the regional balance in ways that can undermine U.S. objectives. A hemisphere that is “stable” because citizens are afraid, courts are compliant, and prisons are overflowing is stable only in the short term. In the medium term, it produces exactly the kinds of brittle states that generate new displacement, new criminal markets, and new forms of anti-American politics.

The key point is not that the United States should ignore migration, cartels, or extra-hemispheric competition. It is that the Corollary’s method—delegated coercion paired with democratic permissiveness—turns U.S. power into something narrower and more coercive, and therefore more fragile. In Latin America, power experienced primarily as detention, deportation, and punishment is rarely durable. It travels fast, but it also backfires fast.

Orlando J. Pérez, Ph.D., is a political science professor at the University of North Texas at Dallas. He authored Civil-Military Relations in Post-Conflict Societies: Transforming the Role of the Military in Central America and Political Culture in Panama: Democracy after Invasion; co-authored Making Police Reform Matter in Latin America, and co-edited Democracy and Security in Latin America: State Capacity and Governance under Stress. As a consultant, he has worked on issues of democratization, civil-military relations, and anti-corruption for the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.N. Development Program.

[1] The White House. (2025, December). 2025 National Security Strategy (pp. 5, 15). https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.

[2] The White House. (2025, December). 2025 National Security Strategy (p. 16). https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.

[3] The White House. (2025, December). 2025 National Security Strategy (p. 11). https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf.

[4] The White House. (2025, December). 2025 National Security Strategy (pp. 5, 13–14, 16). https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

[5] Bubola, E., & Aleaziz, H. (2025, March 16). EE. UU. pagará a El Salvador por encarcelar a presuntos miembros del Tren de Aragua: fuentes. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/latam/domestico/EHIMNRR5EFMEDPAXJD6QMHGAVY-2025-03-15/.

[6] Human Rights Watch. (2025, April 11). Estados Unidos/El Salvador: Desaparición forzada de deportados venezolanos. https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2025/04/11/estados-unidos/el-salvador-desaparicion-forzada-de-deportados-venezolanos.

[7] Human Rights Watch. (2025, November 12). US/El Salvador: Torture of Venezuelan Deportees. https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/11/12/us/el-salvador-torture-of-venezuelan-deportees; Cristosal. (2025, November). “Llegaron al infierno”: Tortura y otros abusos contra venezolanos en el Centro de Confinamiento del Terrorismo de El Salvador (report). https://cristosal.org/ES/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/Llegaron-al-infierno_Tortura-y-otros-abusos-contra-venezolanos-en-el-Centro-de-Confinamiento-del-Terrorismo-de-El-Salvador.pdf.

[8] Amnesty International. (2025, March). Unlawful expulsions to El Salvador endanger lives amid the ongoing state of emergency. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/03/unlawful-expulsions-to-el-salvador-endanger-lives-amid-ongoing-state-of-emergency/.

[9] Finucane, B. (2025, July 17). The Legal Fig Leaf: The US–El Salvador Detainee Diplomatic Notes. Just Security. https://www.justsecurity.org/117271/us-elsalvador-diplomatic-notes/.

[10] El País. (2025, July 8). El Salvador asegura que Estados Unidos tiene “jurisdicción y responsabilidad legal” sobre los inmigrantes deportados al Cecot. El País US. https://elpais.com/us/migracion/2025-07-08/el-salvador-asegura-que-estados-unidos-tiene-jurisdiccion-y-responsabilidad-legal-sobre-los-inmigrantes-deportados-al-cecot.html.

[11] Pérez, O. J. (2025, November 17). The Day After: What Successful Regime Change in Venezuela Would Really Take. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2025/11/the-day-after-what-successful-regime-change-in-venezuela-would-really-take/.

[12] Pérez, O. J. (2026, January 13). After Maduro: Trump’s Managed Authoritarianism Trap in Venezuela. War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2026/01/after-maduro-trumps-managed-authoritarianism-trap-in-venezuela/.

[13] de Bruin, E. (2020). How to Prevent Coups d’État: Counterbalancing and Regime Survival. Cornell University Press. https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501748041/how-to-prevent-coups-detat/.

[14] Trinkunas, H. A. (2000). Crafting civilian control of the military in Venezuela: A comparative perspective. Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42(4), 109–136. https://doi.org/10.2307/166177.

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku (Associate Professor of Political Science; Associate Director of the Peace and War Center): yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris (Associate Professor of Philosophy): dmorris3@norwich.edu

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

In the aftermath of the 2026 U.S. invasion of Venezuela, many observers have drawn comparisons between current U.S. foreign policy and that of earlier historical periods. While initially President Trump justified U.S. military action as a means to curb drug trafficking and depose a dictator, he quickly added oil to this list. Lamenting state control over Venezuelan oil (which displaced American corporations two decades ago), President Trump pledged that the U.S. would “run” Venezuela, pave the way for the return of American investors, and deposit oil proceeds in Qatari bank accounts.[iii] To date, there is no plan for U.S. troops to occupy Venezuela, and former President Maduro’s regime has largely been left in place. On January 29, 2026, acting president Delcy Rodríguez signed a law to open the oil industry to private investors, just as the U.S. Treasury began easing sanctions on Venezuelan oil.[iv]

Such developments harken back to U.S. foreign policy at the turn of the 20^th century under the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which provided a broad and sweeping mandate for U.S. military intervention. While the exact nature of U.S. military intervention varied by country, there was a familiar playbook: the U.S. military invaded Latin American countries, controlled their customs houses, and installed leaders friendly to U.S. interests. The Roosevelt Corollary aimed to promote regional stability, deter European intervention, and advance U.S. economic interests. Yet, by the late 1920s, this foreign policy faced sharp criticism, and both military and business leaders questioned its benefits and sustainability. Why did this pattern of foreign policy fail to advance U.S. interests in the past? What can we learn from this historical evidence to inform U.S. foreign policy today?

The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

In the aftermath of the 1898 Spanish-American War, the U.S. extended its presence in the Caribbean by assuming control of former Spanish colonies and by strengthening its ability to deploy troops. The primary goal of U.S. foreign policy was to enforce the Monroe Doctrine and limit European expansion in the Western Hemisphere, but this goal was hindered by European military incursions to collect debts. Venezuela was the epicenter of these conflicts, as German, British, and Italian forces dispatched their navies to blockade the country and exert military pressure to force its leaders to pay their debts to European creditors. This challenged the Monroe Doctrine, and fears mounted that Germany in particular would use such military interventions as a pretext to seize territories and expand its presence in the U.S. sphere of influence.[v]

To deter such action, Roosevelt announced that the U.S. would be the de facto guarantor of European debts: it would use its military to invade countries in danger of default, and manage their customs houses to ensure that European creditors were repaid. U.S. assurances negated the need for European powers to deploy their forces. Once the U.S. seized Latin American customs houses, it was also well positioned to dictate favorable terms of trade for importing raw materials and exporting manufactured goods.

This style of military intervention, coupled with economic control, continued after Teddy Roosevelt. His successor, President William Taft, rechristened this policy as “Dollar Diplomacy” to emphasize its economic components over military ones, declaring that dollars would substitute for bullets. In practice, however, both dollars and bullets went hand in hand. Between 1898 and 1934, the U.S. launched over 30 military interventions in Latin America.[vi] The length and intensity of the U.S. occupation varied. In Honduras, the U.S. invaded sporadically and relied more upon domestic allies rather than its own troops to maintain control. In cases like Nicaragua, Panama, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, U.S. military occupation was more sustained, lasting anywhere from five to twenty years.

Why Didn’t the Roosevelt Corollary Work?

This style of intervention debuted to applause in U.S. foreign policy and economic circles, lauded for its potential to promote regional stability, deter European intervention, and advance U.S. economic interests. Over time, though, criticism of this style of intervention mounted, particularly as local resistance against U.S. forces became more sustained and violent. U.S. occupation of Nicaragua was a major issue in the 1928 U.S. presidential elections, for example, as ongoing domestic resistance to U.S. forces evolved into a full-scale uprising, led by guerrilla leader Augusto Sandino. Notably, business leaders who originally envisioned themselves as beneficiaries of U.S. policy became some of its most vocal critics. As one U.S. coffee planter in Nicaragua wrote to Secretary of State Henry Stimson:

Today we are hated and despised and in danger of massacre any time the Marines are withdrawn. This feeling has been created by employing the American Marines to hunt down and kill Nicaraguans in their own territory. This was a fatal mistake. The intervention of the U.S. government in the internal affairs of Nicaragua has proved a calamity for the American coffee planters doing business in this Republic.[vii]

Long term, the Roosevelt Corollary backfired. Due to the costs of military intervention in terms of casualties and dollars, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt withdrew U.S. forces from Nicaragua and other Latin American countries, ushering in a new era of U.S. foreign policy, the Good Neighbor Policy.

The Good Neighbor Policy

In 1933, Secretary of State Hull announced that “the United States government is as much opposed as any other government to interference with the freedom, the sovereignty, or other internal affairs or processes of the governments of other nations . . . no government need fear any intervention on the part of the United States . . .”[viii] Notably, the U.S. would no longer use military force to protect the property rights of U.S. citizens abroad; rather, U.S. citizens and companies were under the jurisdiction of the sovereign laws of host countries, and their courts or international arbiters would resolve disputes.

Even during the 1938 Mexican nationalization of the oil industry, the U.S. abided by the Good Neighbor Policy and refused to send its military to protect U.S. property, instead delegating the dispute to a joint commission for arbitration.[ix] FDR declared that promoting trade was the most important component of his foreign policy. To advance U.S. economic interests, he established institutions like the Export-Import Bank and negotiated a series of bilateral trade agreements to reduce tariffs. Trade between the U.S. and Latin American countries rose sharply, providing the U.S. with financial benefits and later securing vital raw materials for the war effort. FDR and Hull thought stronger commercial ties would also yield geopolitical advantages and reduce conflict in the region. FDR credited his Good Neighbor Policy as the cornerstone of hemispheric solidarity during World War II.

What Can We Learn?

The Cold War eventually disrupted the Good Neighbor Policy, but we can learn from the Roosevelt cousins’ different foreign policies. While it may have seemed initially promising to rely upon U.S. military forces to promote geopolitical and economic interests, in the long term, such intervention ultimately provoked anti-American sentiment and insurrection, leading to costly U.S. military occupations. Business leaders themselves were among the first to question the sustainability of military intervention, noting that the backlash it inspired jeopardized their investments.

In contrast, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy promoted international trade, benefitting U.S. investors and securing access to vital raw materials during World War II. Hemispheric solidarity reduced the Axis powers’ ability to gain traction in the hemisphere, thereby promoting U.S. security. These contrasts remind us to consider not just the short-term gains, but long-term sustainability and the impact of relying upon U.S. military intervention to achieve economic and geopolitical goals.

Mary Fran T. Malone (Ph.D. University of Pittsburgh) is Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the University of New Hampshire. Her research focuses on political attitudes and behaviors in Latin America, particularly citizen support for the rule of law, political institutions, and democratic governance. Prof. Malone’s recent book, Making Police Reform Matter in Latin America, examines how democracies can build police forces that fight crime while also protecting the civil liberties and rights of the citizens they serve.

[i] Theodore Roosevelt, “The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” as cited in Latin American and the United States: a Documentary History, second edition, eds. R. H. Holden and E. Zolov (Oxford University Press, 2011), 97. Original quote in 1904.

[ii] Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “The Good Neighbor Policy,” as cited in Latin American and the United States: a Documentary History, 133. Original quote in 1933.

[iii] Reuters, “Venezuelan Banks Will Get $300 Million of Oil Money to Sell on Exchange Market, Sources Say,” January 16, 2026.

[iv] PBS News, “Venezuela’s Acting President Signs Overhaul Easing State Control of Oil Industry into Law,” January 29, 2026. To reassure foreign investors, this legislation stipulated that disputes would be arbitrated in independent courts, rather than Venezuelan ones.

[v] Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, fifth edition (Oxford University Press, 2021).

[vi] Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World.

[vii] Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, 95.

[viii] As quoted in Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World, 97.

[ix] Cordell Hull, “Just Compensation for the Good Neighbor,” as cited in Latin American and the United States: a Documentary History, 142. Original statement in 1938.

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku (Associate Professor of Political Science; Associate Director of the Peace and War Center): yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris (Associate Professor of Philosophy): dmorris3@norwich.edu

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

Since returning to the White House in 2025, President Trump has made the western hemisphere a top priority in US foreign policy. After a buildup of naval forces in the Caribbean accompanied by public rhetoric of “narcoterrorism,” the 2026 new year witnessed the capture and detention of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on weapons and drug trafficking charges. Trump capped off Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE with threats of similar action against Greenland, Colombia, Iran, and Mexico, and suggested that Cuba would self-destruct without its Venezuelan lifeline.

With the declaration of the so-called “Donroe Doctrine” and the return to open US military interventionism in Latin America, the American public is once again paying attention to a region that has generally been neglected since the end of the Cold War. Much of the news media commentary suffers from a blinkered historical view. The purpose of this article is to correct some of the most common misunderstandings in contemporary public discourse and to apply insights from over a decade of historical research on US-Soviet-Latin American relations.

The Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary

The first popular misconception relates to the Monroe Doctrine and its history. Many are declaring the “Donroe Doctrine” to be a return to form for the United States. These commentators tend to mischaracterize the Monroe Doctrine as a statement of US “ownership” of the western hemisphere. The declaration, drafted by John Quincy Adams and buried in the text of President James Monroe’s 1823 speech to Congress, was crafted in the context of South American wars of national liberation from Spanish colonialism and was intended to signal to the Europeans that any attempt to reclaim their colonies in the western hemisphere via force of arms would be unwelcome. In 1823, the United States was very far from possessing the sort of naval power necessary to enforce this challenge to the European great powers, and though diplomats initially protested, the “doctrine” was largely ignored.

The “Donroe Doctrine” is much more akin to the Roosevelt Corollary, issued at the turn of the twentieth century, which asserted the US right to police the hemisphere. Inspired by Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt oversaw the expansion of the US Navy and transformed the United States into an empire. After the war of 1898, the United States assumed colonial or quasi-colonial control over Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam, and would go on to invade and occupy several other Caribbean countries, including Haiti, the Dominican

Republic, and Nicaragua. Additionally, Mahan and Roosevelt both agreed that the United States must secure ownership of any future transoceanic canal. In 1903, the state of Panama was born through a US-instigated secession from Colombia after the country’s Senate rejected the terms of the proposed Hay-Herrán treaty, which would have granted Washington a 100-year lease on the narrow isthmus of Panama, which was part of Colombia at the time. The United States obtained leasing rights and held them until President Jimmy Carter finalized a new treaty with Panamanian President Omar Torrijos in 1977. Current accusations that the Panamanian government has allowed the canal to be taken over by the Chinese are unfounded and out of touch with the enormous value the Panamanian people place on sovereignty and control of their own territory and resources.

The Role of Oil

Another topic that has gotten much play in the public debate and news media is oil. Venezuela is home to the world’s largest untapped crude oil reserve. However, many commentators are missing the point that US control of Venezuelan oil is aimed more at denying access to US adversaries than supplying domestic markets. The United States is a net energy exporter and does not rely on Venezuelan crude. The Cuban communist regime, however, is dependent on Venezuelan oil, and the island’s economy is currently weathering the most disastrous economic conditions since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Though Venezuelan oil shipments were already declining due to Maduro’s severe economic mismanagement, conditions in Cuba have deteriorated even further, and the Cuban regime is cracking down on human rights activists who may feel emboldened by Maduro’s overthrow.

The presence of oil is a necessary but not sufficient condition for explaining the US intervention in Venezuela. Washington has long opposed Latin American leaders who refuse to support US policy. After Hugo Chávez was elected in 1999, the George W. Bush administration objected to both his left-populist economic policies and his foreign policy agenda. Chávez criticized the 2003 US invasion of Iraq as an imperialist war for oil, and forged alliances with Cuba and Russia. He formed a close friendship with Fidel Castro, who served as a mentor to the younger leader and offered guidance on navigating relations with both the United States and Russia. Castro had learned key lessons from his experiences with the superpowers during the Cold War, including the importance of South-South solidarity in the face of great-power accord, like the one negotiated between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during the missile crisis in 1962.

Lessons from the Cold War

Castro and the Cuban revolutionaries had also learned lessons from the 1954 CIA-backed military coup in Guatemala. Ernesto “Che” Guevara had been in Guatemala at the time and left convinced that if only President Jacobo Arbenz had armed the workers and peasants, they would have fought to keep him in power. For Guevara, the most urgent task facing any revolution was to disband the regularly constituted armed forces and arm the people to fight the forces of reaction, which would be swift and merciless. After taking power in Cuba in 1959, Castro applied these lessons, purging the armed forces and establishing revolutionary defense committees to serve as the “eyes and ears” of the revolution. He would go on to help Chávez “coup-proof” the Venezuelan armed forces.

US support of the unsuccessful military coup against Chávez in 2002 replicated a repeated error of Washington’s Cold War foreign policy, radicalizing the government it failed to replace. Similarly, in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs debacle in 1961, Cuban public support coalesced around the regime, which Castro declared communist for the first time. The ill-fated invasion was the proximate cause of the missile crisis, as it convinced Khrushchev that Washington would not tolerate the existence of the Cuban revolution. Not only did the United States fail to dislodge Castro, but its repeated efforts to do so only strengthened his regime. Economic sanctions, assassination attempts, and support for Cuban exile attacks provided the Cuban communists a lightning rod for domestic criticism. Ultimately, Washington facilitated the regime’s survival by enabling it to avoid accountability for its own disastrous economic policies.

In 2014, President Barack Obama enacted targeted sanctions on Venezuelan officials in response to concerns over corruption and human rights violations. Despite decades of evidence from the Cuban example that sanctions are incapable of achieving regime change, in 2017, Trump vastly expanded the sanctions against Venezuela. The express intent was to create so much suffering that the people and the armed forces would rise up and overthrow Maduro. The same logic was employed against Castro.

The Fate of Communism in Latin America

Viewing hemispheric problems primarily through the lens of security, US policymakers have tended to neglect underlying causes of violence and instability: poverty, inequality, and state oppression, all of which enhanced the ideological appeal of Marxism. The US response to the rise of armed guerrilla movements was to empower the armed forces and security services of US allies, creating opportunities for despotic rulers to govern through force and intimidation. This has led to cycles of revolution and counterrevolution.

For their part, the Russians have tended to view relations with Latin America as partly open to negotiation with the United States for concessions in what Moscow considers its own “sphere of influence” or “near abroad.” Although the Russian foreign minister condemned the US intervention in Venezuela, Putin has so far remained uncharacteristically silent. Those who are suggesting the overthrow of Maduro is a strategic blow to Moscow are missing the point. Freedom of action in Ukraine and the former Soviet space is far more important to Putin than Latin America will ever be.

The chance of a peaceful collapse of communism in Cuba is not nil. The long-suffering Cuban people are ready for a change, though their identity is rooted in being the David to Washington’s Goliath and in a humanitarian foreign policy that provides aid (especially in the medical field) to countries around the world. US bellicosity, furthermore, only fuels the anti-American ideology that fires the communist left in Latin America. Regardless of what comes next, long-term stability in the region requires a serious and sustained commitment to regional multilateral diplomacy and respectful cooperation with US allies and partners.

Dr. Michelle D. Paranzino is T.C. Sass Chair in Maritime Irregular Warfare and Director of the Latin America Studies Group at the US Naval War College. The opinions expressed here are hers alone and do not represent those of her employer or any other part of the US government.

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku (Associate Professor of Political Science; Associate Director of the Peace and War Center): yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris (Associate Professor of Philosophy): dmorris3@norwich.edu

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

Moldova’s formal withdrawal from the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is not a bureaucratic footnote. It is a geopolitical rupture, and Moscow knows it. Chişinău is now denouncing the founding CIS agreements and accelerating its integration with Europe. Russia has lost one of its last institutional levers in the post-Soviet space. The Kremlin’s reaction, warning Moldova of “consequences” and framing the move as a Western-orchestrated betrayal, reveals exactly how Moscow interprets this moment: as a closing window, and therefore as an opportunity.[1]

For years, Russia has treated Moldova as a buffer state, a pliable neighbor whose political trajectory could be nudged back toward Moscow through energy pressure, disinformation, or the ever-present threat of Transnistria. That era is over. Moldova is sprinting toward Europe, and Russia is running out of time. The danger is not theoretical. It is immediate, structural, and tied directly to Russia’s long-standing ambition to seize Odesa, landlocked Ukraine, and consolidate its hold over the Donbas and the southern land corridor.

Moldova’s CIS exit is the trigger Moscow has been waiting for.

Transnistria: Russia’s Ready-Made Pretext

Transnistria has been a Russian forward operating base since 1992, when the 14th Guards Army shattered Moldovan positions at Bender and froze the conflict on Moscow’s terms. The enclave’s leadership remains aligned with Russia, its security forces are intertwined with the Operational Group of Russian Forces, and the massive Cobasna ammunition depot—one of Europe’s largest—provides both logistical depth and political leverage.[2]

This is not a dormant conflict. It is a dormant front.

Russian commanders have openly stated that creating a land corridor from Crimea to Transnistria is part of Moscow’s long-term war aims.[3] The logic is brutally simple: if Russia can pressure Odesa from both the east and the west, Ukraine becomes a landlocked state dependent on Western aid. The Kremlin understands that Odesa is not merely a city. It is Ukraine’s last deep-water port, its economic lifeline, and the anchor of its maritime sovereignty.

Moldova’s CIS withdrawal gives Moscow the narrative it needs to activate Transnistria. Russia can claim that Moldova’s “anti-Russian” turn threatens Russian speakers in the region, that Chişinău’s EU trajectory undermines regional stability, or that Moldova’s legal break from the post-Soviet space requires “protective measures.” These are the same narratives Russia used in Crimea, Donbas, and Georgia. They are not new. What is new is the timing.

A New Front Northwest of Odesa

If Russia chooses to escalate, it need not invade Moldova conventionally. It can activate Transnistria internally, stage provocations, or reinforce the enclave covertly. The geography is unforgiving: Transnistria sits just 45 miles from Odesa. A limited Russian escalation—sabotage, diversionary attacks, seizure of key infrastructure—would force Ukraine to divert troops from critical fronts and strain its already strained defenses.[4]

This is precisely the kind of asymmetry Russia seeks. After two years of grinding attrition, Moscow knows it cannot achieve a decisive breakthrough in the east without altering the war’s geometry. A new axis of pressure from the west would do precisely that. It would destabilize Moldova, threaten Odesa, and trigger panic across NATO’s southeastern flank.

The Kremlin does not need to conquer Moldova. It only needs to weaponize the enclave it already controls.

The 45-Day Window: Russia’s Logistical Reality

Yet this scenario contains a paradox. Russia may be preparing to open a new front, but it cannot sustain one. The Russian military’s logistical failures since 2022 have been well documented: inadequate supply lines, brittle transport networks, insufficient fuel reserves, and chronic shortages of precision munitions. Analysts across NATO, RAND, RUSI, and independent military studies reach the same conclusion: Russia’s operational endurance is limited. Its ability to sustain high-tempo offensive operations collapses rapidly without secure logistics.[5]

This is why this thesis is strategically sound: Russia has no more than 45 days of operational endurance for a high-intensity campaign to seize Odesa. The Kremlin knows this. If Russia opens a new front through Transnistria, it must achieve rapid, decisive gains before logistical failure forces a halt. This is not speculation. It is the pattern of Russian operations since 2014: short bursts of offensive action followed by long periods of consolidation.

A 45-day window is not enough to conquer Moldova. It is barely enough to destabilize it. But it is sufficient to create the conditions for a strike on Odesa—if Russia believes the West will hesitate.

Why Moldova Matters More Than Ever

Moldova is not the prize. Odesa is. Moldova is the hinge on which the next phase of the war may turn. If Russia can destabilize Moldova, activate Transnistria, and pressure Odesa from the west, it can complete the maritime encirclement of Ukraine. A landlocked Ukraine would be economically strangled, dependent on Western aid, and forced into negotiations on Moscow’s terms.[6]

This is why Russia is watching Moldova’s exit from the CIS so closely. It is not about the CIS itself—a hollow institution long past its relevance. It is about what the exit represents: Moldova’s final break from Moscow’s orbit, its alignment with Europe, and its refusal to accept a future defined by Russian coercion.

For the Kremlin, this is intolerable. And for that reason, it is dangerous.

The West Cannot Ignore the Warning Signs

The West has repeatedly underestimated Russia’s willingness to exploit political fractures, hybrid vulnerabilities, and frozen conflicts. Moldova is the next test. If Russia succeeds in destabilizing Moldova or activating Transnistria, the consequences will be immediate and severe: pressure on Odesa, diversion of Ukrainian forces, destabilization of Romania’s border, and a crisis that NATO is not structurally prepared to manage.

The warning signs are already visible. Russia has intensified disinformation campaigns, increased funding for pro-Russian political actors in Moldova, and framed Moldova’s exit from the CIS as a hostile act.[7] These are the same indicators that preceded escalation in Georgia and Ukraine.

Ignoring them now would be a catastrophic mistake.

A Short War With Long Consequences

Russia may lack the resources to sustain a long campaign, but it does not need one. A short, sharp 45-day offensive aimed at destabilizing Moldova and threatening Odesa would achieve Moscow’s strategic objectives: landlocking Ukraine, fracturing Western unity, and consolidating gains in the Donbas and the southern corridor.

The West must understand that Russia’s weakness does not make it less dangerous. It makes the situation more urgent. A state that cannot sustain a long war has every incentive to launch a short one.

Moldova’s exit from the CIS is not the end of an era. It is the beginning of a test. The next 45 days of any Russian offensive may determine the next 45 years of European security.

Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. During his Marine Corps career, he deployed to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. His published works can be found in USNI’s Proceedings, Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, and the Journal of the American Revolution.

[1] Kyiv Independent, “Moldova moving to withdraw from Russian-led CIS.”

[2] Philip Remler, Transdniestria, Moldova, and Russia’s War in Ukraine (Carnegie Endowment, 2022).

[3] Telegraph Online, “Russia seeks to capture southern Ukraine,” April 22, 2022.

[4] Rob Picheta, “How Transnistria… is getting pulled into the war,” CNN, April 27, 2022.

[5] Ronald Ti and Christopher Kinsey, “Primacy of logistics,” Defence Studies 23, no. 3 (2023).

[6] James M. Deitch, “Russia’s Long Game: Maritime Dominance, Territorial Consolidation, and the Coming Test in Moldova.” Voices on Peace and War (January 23, 2026).

[7] RFI, “How Russian Disinformation Flooded Moldova’s Media Landscape Ahead of Election,” September 27, 2025. MSN, “Russia Warns of Consequences as Moldova Quits CIS,” accessed January 2026.

The authors of this forum, Voices on Peace and War (VPW), explore domestic and global issues broadly tied to the theme of peace and war. Sponsored by the John and Mary Frances Patton Peace & War Center of Norwich University, VPW features subject matter experts and students who present their opinions and arguments on critical issues related to peace and war in the international community. We hope that a chorus of small voices in this forum will help illuminate a world filled with a variety of complex challenges.

Co-editor: Dr. Yangmo Ku (Associate Professor of Political Science; Associate Director of the Peace and War Center): yku@norwich.edu

Co-editor: Dr. Dan. Morris (Associate Professor of Philosophy): dmorris3@norwich.edu

Please send the editors your opinion articles (750-1,500 words) for publication review. View guidelines.

The war in Ukraine is often framed as a sequence of crises — Crimea in 2014, the Donbas conflict, the full‑scale invasion of 2022, and the grinding attrition that has followed. Yet this episodic framing obscures the deeper continuity of Russian strategy. In my assessment, Russia’s performance throughout the conflict points to a long war strategy built on territorial consolidation, maritime encirclement, and the systematic weakening of Ukraine’s economic and political capacity. As the conflict enters another winter and Western political cycles shift, Russia is positioning itself for a decisive spring campaign to close Ukraine’s remaining access to the Black Sea, destabilize Moldova, and test Europe’s willingness to defend its eastern frontier.

A Fractured West and Moscow’s Calculus

The diplomatic landscape has grown more volatile with the introduction of President Donald Trump’s 28‑point peace plan — a proposal that has intensified political anxiety in Kyiv, Moscow, and across Europe. As reported by multiple outlets, the plan would require Ukraine to surrender significant territory, including formal recognition of Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as Russian territory, while freezing the front lines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.[1] It would also compel Ukraine to renounce future NATO membership, reduce its armed forces, and accept the withdrawal of all NATO personnel from its territory. Sanctions on Russia would be lifted, and frozen Russian assets would be redirected toward reconstruction. For Ukraine, these terms amount to coerced capitulation. President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly stated that he has “no legal right” and “no moral right” to cede sovereign territory, rejecting the plan’s core concessions outright. European leaders have likewise warned that pressuring Ukraine into territorial concessions risks emboldening Moscow and fracturing Western unity. Rather than stabilizing the conflict, the plan has exposed the fragility of Western cohesion at the very moment Russia is preparing for renewed offensive action.

Compounding this instability is the uneven signaling from the United States and its allies. Washington’s rhetoric has swung between firm declarations of support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and periodic suggestions that Kyiv may need to consider “difficult compromises.” Delays in military aid, congressional infighting, and fluctuating public statements have created the impression of a West committed in principle but hesitant in practice. Moscow has taken careful note. Russia has long believed that Western unity is brittle and that time, political fatigue, and domestic pressures will erode the coalition supporting Ukraine.[2]

Europe’s posture has been similarly fragmented. Eastern European states, acutely aware of the Russian threat, have pushed for sustained military assistance and a clear commitment to a Ukrainian victory. Western European states have often favored diplomatic engagement and gradual de‑escalation. Germany’s vacillation over weapons deliveries, France’s shifting rhetoric on negotiations, and Hungary’s persistent obstruction within the EU have reinforced the perception of a continent divided not only by geography but also by strategic worldview. Even when Europe presents a unified front on paper, the underlying fractures are visible, and Russia has calibrated its strategy accordingly. These inconsistencies matter because they shape Russia’s risk calculus. A West that appears uncertain or divided encourages Moscow to believe that further escalation — whether in Odesa, Mykolaiv, or Moldova — may not trigger a decisive response. Mixed signals from Washington and European capitals have therefore become an enabling condition for Russia’s next phase of operations.

This analysis argues that Russia will continue consolidating its power in eastern and southern Ukraine and, in the spring, will move to fully landlock Ukraine, using Moldova as a low‑risk proving ground to gauge European resolve before considering more ambitious coercive actions against Finland and the Baltic States. Russia is not seeking peace; it is seeking time. Patience, attrition, and incremental advantage remain the core of its strategy, and the West risks misjudging the scale and immediacy of what is coming.

From Crimea to the Land Corridor

The origins of the present conflict lie in the aftermath of the 2014 Maidan Revolution, when Russia seized Crimea and sparked separatist uprisings in Donetsk and Luhansk. The annexation of Crimea was swift, decisive, and strategically transformative. By absorbing the peninsula, Russia secured the port of Sevastopol, gained uncontested control of the northern Black Sea, and established a permanent platform to pressure Ukraine.

In the Donbas, Russia pursued a different model: a grinding, low-intensity conflict designed to weaken Ukraine, drain its resources, and prevent its integration with Western institutions. The self-proclaimed “people’s republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk became frozen conflict zones — neither fully controlled by Russia nor fully governed by Ukraine. This ambiguity served Moscow’s interests for nearly a decade.

These events were not isolated crises but the opening moves in a long war. They established the pattern Russia continues to follow: seize key terrain, create political ambiguity, and treat time as a strategic asset. Yet they were only the prelude to the far more consequential struggle that began in 2022.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022, it attempted a multi-axis assault to decapitate the Ukrainian government. The northern thrust toward Kyiv failed, but the southern and eastern offensives revealed Russia’s true priorities. After withdrawing from Kyiv and Kharkiv, Russia concentrated its forces on the Donbas and the southern coastline — the regions that matter most for long-term strategic control.

This recalibration was not a retreat from ambition. It was a recognition that the decisive terrain lay not in the capital but along the coastline, in the industrial east, and along the land corridor linking Russia to Crimea. By late 2022, Russia had entrenched itself across four major regions: Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. These territories form the backbone of Russia’s current strategy and serve as staging grounds for what comes next.

Russia’s consolidation of Luhansk and Donetsk has given it control over much of the Donbas, a region rich in industrial infrastructure and Soviet-era logistics networks. These territories also carry ideological weight for Moscow, which portrays them as historically and culturally aligned with Russia. The slow, methodical capture of these regions has allowed Russia to build layered defenses, mobilize manpower, and create a fortified eastern front that Ukraine has struggled to penetrate.

Zaporizhzhia, by contrast, is the hinge of Russia’s southern strategy. Control of this region secures the land corridor from Russia to Crimea — a logistical lifeline that allows Russia to supply its forces without relying on the vulnerable Kerch Bridge. The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in Europe, also provides leverage: a strategic asset Russia can use to intimidate Ukraine and Europe.[3]

Kherson, the first major city Russia captured in 2022, remains strategically vital despite Ukraine’s liberation of the western bank of the Dnipro. Russia’s continued presence on the eastern bank protects Crimea’s northern approaches and allows Moscow to threaten Mykolaiv and Odesa. The Dnipro River has become a natural defensive barrier, enabling Russia to hold the region with fewer forces while maintaining strategic pressure.

Taken together, these four regions give Russia depth, defensibility, and the ability to project power westward and southward. They also serve as the staging ground for Russia’s next strategic objective, maritime dominance.

The Maritime Center of Gravity

Russia’s southern strategy centers on a series of key cities and ports that define the maritime geography of the conflict. The capture of Melitopol, Berdiansk, and Mariupol has already reshaped the strategic landscape. Melitopol serves as the logistical heart of the land bridge, a critical junction linking Russian forces in Donbas to Crimea. Berdiansk provides Russia with a secondary port on the Sea of Azov, enabling naval operations, logistics, and amphibious staging. Mariupol’s fall in 2022 was one of the war’s most consequential events, completing Russia’s control of the Sea of Azov and linking Russian-held territories into a continuous corridor.[4]

Yet these gains, significant as they are, represent only part of Russia’s maritime ambition. The true center of gravity lies further west, where Odesa and Mykolaiv form the last defensive shield preventing Russia from landlocking Ukraine. Odesa is Ukraine’s final major deep-water port — the gateway to global markets and the lifeline for grain exports that sustain both Ukraine’s economy and global food security. Mykolaiv, with its shipyards and industrial capacity, serves as the industrial bulwark protecting Odesa from the east.

Russia understands that without Odesa, Ukraine becomes a landlocked state dependent on overland routes through Europe. The maritime squeeze is therefore not merely a military objective but also an economic one. By controlling the Sea of Azov and restricting access to the Black Sea, Russia can strangle Ukraine’s economy, limit its export capacity, and increase its dependence on Western aid. The pressure on Odesa and Mykolaiv is thus part of a broader strategy to render Ukraine economically unsustainable.

This maritime strategy extends beyond Ukraine’s borders. Moldova, west of Odesa, has become a critical pressure point in Russia’s broader plan. If Russia can destabilize Moldova and pressure Odesa from the west, it can complete the maritime encirclement of Ukraine. A fully landlocked Ukraine would be economically strangled, dependent on Western aid, and unable to export grain and industrial goods at scale. This would give Russia enormous leverage in future negotiations and fundamentally alter the regional balance of power.

Moldova: The Proving Ground

Moldova has emerged as a critical pressure point in Russia’s broader strategy, as its recent elections strengthened pro‑Western forces in Chişinău and accelerated the country’s shift toward Europe. Now a formal candidate for European Union membership — with accession negotiations opened in late 2023 and formal talks that began in 2024 and continue to this day, Moldova is moving rapidly toward deeper political and economic integration with the West, a trajectory Moscow views as a direct challenge to its influence in a region it has long considered within its sphere.[5] Moldova is also a long‑standing member of the United Nations, fully recognized since 1992, which grants it international legitimacy and complicates any overt Russian intervention.[6]

Yet Moldova’s most consequential characteristic is its constitutional neutrality, which prevents it from joining NATO even as it cooperates closely with the alliance through the Partnership for Peace and various defense‑capacity programs.[7] This creates a uniquely vulnerable position: Moldova is aligned with the West politically and economically but not protected by NATO’s Article V guarantees. For Russia, this combination makes Moldova an ideal testing ground — a place where it can probe Western resolve, exploit political fragility, and assess whether Europe and the United States are willing to defend a non‑NATO partner before considering more ambitious moves against the Baltic States.

Transnistria — a narrow strip of land along Moldova’s eastern border — has been under the control of pro-Russian separatists since the early 1990s. Russian troops remain stationed there under the guise of “peacekeepers.”[8] Militarily, absorbing or fully controlling Transnistria would require little effort on Russia’s part. The region is isolated, lightly defended, and politically aligned with Moscow.

But Russia does not need Moldova for its resources or geography. It needs Moldova for what it represents: a test. A move against Moldova would allow Russia to determine whether Europe will respond collectively or fracture along political lines, whether NATO will treat aggression near its borders as a threat to the alliance, and whether Finland and the Baltic States would stand alone or with unified Western backing. Moldova is the perfect proving ground because the military risk is low, but the political signal is enormous. If Europe hesitates, Russia will interpret that hesitation as a green light for more aggressive coercion elsewhere. Whether Russia has the capacity to pursue that path is questionable.

Russia’s strategy is not built on rapid breakthroughs but on cumulative advantage. Moscow understands that Western political cycles create windows of opportunity. As the current U.S. administration continues to send mixed signals, Russia sees an opportunity to exploit uncertainty, fatigue, and shifting priorities.

Russia continues to rely on massed artillery, mobilized manpower, and fortified defensive lines. This approach is slow but effective. It forces Ukraine to expend resources faster than they can be replaced and strains Western stockpiles. Russia’s engagement with peace proposals is performative. Moscow uses ceasefire discussions to buy time, reposition forces, and shape international narratives. There is no evidence that Russia intends to negotiate a settlement that leaves Ukraine sovereign and intact.

By spring, Russia will likely consolidate its current lines in the east and south, intensify pressure on Odesa and Mykolaiv, conduct hybrid destabilization operations in Moldova, and use Transnistria as a pretext for intervention. These moves will test Europe’s willingness to respond and lay the political and military groundwork for future coercion against Finland and the Baltic States. Russia does not need to conquer these countries outright. It only needs to demonstrate that NATO will not defend them. Moldova is the rehearsal for that test.

The Test Ahead for Europe

Russia’s war in Ukraine is not a series of disconnected events but a coherent, long‑term strategy to reshape Eastern Europe’s security architecture. Each phase of the conflict — from Crimea to the Donbas to the southern land corridor — has advanced Moscow’s goal of weakening Ukraine, fracturing Europe, and reasserting Russian influence over the territories that once formed the Soviet Union’s strategic perimeter. The decisive terrain in this struggle is the south: the Black Sea, the ports, and the economic arteries that keep Ukraine alive. The decisive test, however, lies to the southwest. Moldova serves as a low‑risk proving ground where Russia can probe European and American resolve before considering more ambitious coercive actions.

If Russia succeeds in landlocking Ukraine and destabilizing Moldova, the balance of power in Eastern Europe will shift dramatically. A Ukraine cut off from the Black Sea would be economically strangled, dependent on Western aid, and unable to sustain long-term resistance. A Moldova thrown into crisis would expose the fragility of Europe’s political cohesion and cast doubt on the credibility of Western security guarantees. Such an outcome would not merely consolidate Russia’s gains in Ukraine; it would embolden Moscow to test the limits of Western tolerance elsewhere.

In such a scenario, the next targets are not hypothetical. The Baltic States — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — remain the most vulnerable frontline democracies in Europe. They are small, geographically exposed, and home to Russian‑speaking minorities that Moscow has repeatedly invoked in its narratives of “protection” and “historical unity.” An attack on the Baltics would align closely with Vladimir Putin’s long‑standing vision of restoring the influence, if not the borders, of the former Soviet Union. Finland, though now a NATO member with a formidable military, presents a more difficult challenge. By contrast, the Baltics offer Russia the symbolic and strategic opportunity to test Article V directly, forcing the West to show whether collective defense is a binding commitment or a political aspiration.

This is why Moldova matters so profoundly. Any Russian action there — whether hybrid destabilization, political manipulation, or overt military pressure — would serve as a rehearsal for a larger confrontation. It would allow Moscow to gauge whether the United States and Europe are prepared to respond decisively or whether political fatigue, internal division, and strategic hesitation will again create space for Russian escalation. The coming spring will not be a pause in the conflict. It will be the next phase of a long war — one in which Russia continues to tighten the vise, consolidate its gains, and test the foundations of European collective defense. The choices the West makes now will determine not only Ukraine’s future but also Europe’s security architecture for decades to come.

Dr. James M. Deitch was born in Philadelphia and raised in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. During his Marine Corps career, he deployed to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Norway, and aboard the USS Saratoga. Deitch holds a master’s degree in military history from Norwich University and a doctoral degree in intellectual history from Liberty University. His published works can be found in USNI’s Proceedings, Total War Magazine, Concealed Carry Magazine, Real Clear Defense, and the Journal of the American Revolution.

[1] Barak Ravid and Dave Lawler, “Trump’s Ukraine‑Russia Peace Plan, in the Full 28 Points,” Axios, November 20, 2025. “Exclusive: Trump’s Full 28‑Point Ukraine‑Russia Peace Plan,” MSN, December 2025. “Trump’s Ukraine‑Russia Peace Plan, in the Full 28 Points,” The New Arab, November 2025.

[2] Michael Kofman and Rob Lee, “The Russian Military’s Lessons From Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs 102, no. 6 (November/December 2023). Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, “What If Ukraine Loses?” Foreign Affairs 102, no. 5 (September/October 2023).

[3] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), “IAEA Director General’s Update on the Situation in Ukraine,” IAEA.org, March 2023.

[4] Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia Claims Full Control of Mariupol, Securing the Sea of Azov,” The New York Times, May 20, 2022.

[5] European Commission, “EU–Moldova Relations,” European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, last modified September 22, 2025.

[6] United Nations, “Member States: Republic of Moldova,” UN.org, accessed December 21, 2025

[7] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Relations with the Republic of Moldova,” NATO.int, last updated July 2025.

[8] Organization for Security and Co‑operation in Europe (OSCE), “Mission to Moldova: Background and Mandate,” OSCE.org, accessed December 21, 2025.